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This chapter lays out the purpose behind this thesis as well as the scope of the 
effort.  Essential terminology and the methodology used during this research are 
presented.   
A. VIRTUAL MILITARY MARKETS? 
This Virtual Military Market (VMM) thesis starts to paint the picture of how E-
Bay like markets can be utilized by DOD for command, control, communications, and 
collaboration (C4).  Capital markets with profit incentives are not the focus of this study; 
the organizational principals of markets that produce effective distributed operations 
capabilities--especially for decision making and information sharing-- are central to this 
study.  “Self-synchronizing” and “demand driven” are force transformation buzz words; 
they are also terms that have been associated with markets throughout history.  
Consumers drive markets and create opportunities for solution providers to meet their 
demands—in other words markets synchronize supply and demand.  These principles are 
time tested; market mechanics and their decentralized principles are ways of thinking 
about coordination that have existed since the Byzantine Empire.   
A new breed of market, called a virtual market, has emerged at the intersection of 
markets and information technology.  These markets provide extensive reach to the most 
distant of consumers.  Today the web offers virtual markets such as E-Bay and Amazon 
(E-Bay, 2005).  Something closer to what is being illustrated here is called Elance.  
Elance is a professional services market that allows accountants, web designers, 
translators and others to bid on buyer requirements (Elance, 2005).  This type of market 
is often referred to as a reverse or buyer’s market.  E-Bay, Amazon, and Elance are good 
examples of global markets, enabled by information technology.  These information age 
markets are available to anyone with internet access, and enable the realization of another 
transformation phrase, “Power to the Edge” (Albert & Hayes, 2003).  
Virtual markets are not technically difficult; they have just extended the reach of 
the consumer and supplier.  This fact is the key to market utility-- no matter the 
complexity of virtual markets use-- what is important about them is their ability to link 
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the demand of consumers with the innovation of suppliers.  Translating that into the 
military environment, this thesis illustrates how virtual military markets are able to 
respond to the needs of the Joint Forces Commander’s demands for:  information and 
intelligence, the development of new solution sets for effects-based operations, and reach 
to remote & specialized skills of all types.   
How the C4 demands of routine operations, crises and planning can be met by the 
VMM, as well as how a repository of unprecedented knowledge is created are explored 
throughout this thesis.  Imagine a crises event that has just happened; you now turn to an 
E-Bay like market for your decision making needs.  In short order, the accumulated 
knowledge and experience of your forces start presenting available solutions.  They 
collaborate to develop new solutions; you are now able to distinguish between your 
choices by mission essential and other relevant factors.  The crisis certainly wasn’t 
planned, but the routine use of the VMM has refined this method of C4 and you have 
great confidence in the solutions presented by your forces.  This strategy takes advantage 
of the knowledge and power of the many and represents a vision of the knowledge age.   
B. SCOPE 
This section lays out the research questions that are answered in this thesis, states 
some of the assumptions used during the research as well and the limitations and 
delimitations of this study. 
1. Research Questions  
• Why a market model?  What are the conditions that prescribe this type of 
alternative C4 mechanisms?  Why change? 
• What are internal markets and how can they contribute to DOD C4?  
• What variables are needed for a DOD internal market model?  What are the 
essential “macro” variables required for market existence, and what are the 
some of the “micro” transaction variables to facilitate market effectiveness?  
• How would this model be used to improve the Intelligence process?  What are 
the testable hypotheses for market validation? 




This thesis assumes that available networks and communications mechanisms are 
in place to provide market access down to the unit level.  Virtual markets are based upon 
web enabled open standards technology.    
3. Limitations/Delimitations 
This thesis develops the virtual market based model through the third step of 
model development; it does not test or validate the model beyond logical conclusions.  
This study is focused on building the transaction level of markets (individual exchanges) 
versus analysis capabilities for those transactions.   
C. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Adhocracy:  this thesis uses the word in an aggregate form from a combined 
definitional basis to mean-- without bureaucracy, focused to a purpose with available 
resources, and an organizational form. 
Internal markets:  markets that are used as C4 mechanisms within an 
organization or other defined community. 
Market mechanisms:  those processes needed to facilitate market exchanges 
from requirement presentation, solution presentation to post transaction analysis. 
Transaction space:  the virtual network location where exchanges are made. 
Value basis:  a mechanism to show resource use.  This thesis doesn’t attempt to 
provide a representation of the “true value” of information, resources, human time or life.  
Instead value is an expression of the quantity of those resources used in solutions and 
record of quality historical performance metrics.  This value basis may be used by other 
analysis methods to consider true value but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Three primary research methods are used in this thesis; a heuristic review, model 
development, and use case presentation. 
1. Heuristic Communication Structures Review 
The first part of this thesis reviews the need for alternative C4 structures as well 
as information sharing strategies.  A review of related literature on communications 
enabled organizational structures is presented, specifically highlighting the internal 
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markets solutions made possible by the presence of today’s advanced communications 
architectures.  Organizations that have used internal market are explored along with the 
basics of virtual exchanges and communications in commercial markets. 
2. Develop a Military Market Model 
This portion of the thesis builds a market model designed for military planning 
and operations.  A military business process is presented that uses the characteristics and 
mechanics of a virtual market previously reviewed. Some portions of this market require 
experimentation for validation of the concept developed here.  The market model 
construction begins with the methodology found in the text A First Course in 
Mathematical Modeling as a framework to help determine steps required to bring virtual 
markets into the DOD (Giordano & Weir, 2003).   The following steps are used to 
develop this market model: 
Identify the Problem:  The first step to create a market model, or develop a 
specific market, is to identify and make a clear statement of the problem that is 
answerable with the virtual market model.  The problem must be translated from a verbal 
description to market model variables.  This is accomplished by the development (and 
then application) of macro market model variables that are presented in the first part of 
the model development chapter.   This first step helps market creators identify what 
circumstance markets can be used by the DOD.  These macro variables are the 
prerequisites necessary for virtual market existence.   
Once the need for a virtual market is determined, the next step is to develop the 
micro variables and transaction space that create the improved decision making, problem 
solving, or information demands presented in the problem statement.  Some of these 
variables are products of the circumstances or they are derived from other processes or 
submodels and serve as prerequisites for model employment, it is very important to 
understand these dependencies in market development.      
Make Assumptions:  Simplify the task by reducing the number of factors under 
consideration.  Determine what behaviors influence the problem.  Analyze these variables 
to establish the relationship between them and then classify dependent and independent 
variables and identify submodel interrelationships.  In this case, one market at a time 
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should be considered using a constant set of macro market components, then developed 
taking into account the micro market aspects of the transaction space.   
Solve or Interpret the Model:   Use an iterative process to determine if a market 
model can be built by either simplification or refinement to produce a working model that 
can undergo testing and experimentation.  Simplification may involve reducing variables, 
setting constants, adding more assumptions.  Refinement may expand variables under 
consideration, allow variations, or reduce assumptions.  The scale of a market can range 
from one specific course of action to an entire market facilitating the exchange of all of 
an organization’s business process information.  The ultimate refinement of virtual 
markets could consider the analysis and relationships of all markets together in the virtual 
space.  This thesis discusses an intelligence market, which is just one type of operational 
military market. 
Verify the Model:  Test or experiment with the market model.  First, does the 
model answer the problem stated in step one, and does it make common sense?  This 
logic check will be accomplished within this thesis by developing and discussing the 
intelligence use case.  Measurable results will be proposed for validation.  Validation is 
an essential next step, and is accomplished with experimentation, simulation, or in Joint 
Force exercises.  This second step is not accomplished in the term of this thesis; however 
suggestions for experimentation are given.  
Implement the Model:  Establish a joint forces market for improved command, 
control, and collaboration of decision making and/or facilitate intelligence sharing needs.  
This step is beyond the scope of this thesis; however a way ahead to achieve this is 
suggested in the conclusion.  
Maintain the Model:  This step moves the development of markets into the 
maintenance of markets.  Steps one and two are reevaluated to consider if the market still 
solves the problem presented in step one with the assumptions of step two.  This step 
checks the continued validity of any submodels that facilitate the market model 




3. Present a Use Case 
This portion of the thesis walks through a military use case.  The intelligence use 
case presents the adaptation of the military market model with the intelligence process.  
In this way it illustrates the market elements and transactions necessary to develop this 
collaboration and control environment.  Testable hypotheses are presented for the case 
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis explores the utility of market mechanisms for DOD C4.  A heuristic 
review of shortfalls in current C4 systems found by the Defense Science Board, Office of 
Force Transformation, and Command and Control Research Program are presented.  
Alternative C4 methods are explored and internal market structures that can better help 
achieve the principles of Network-Centric Operations are illustrated.   
Using the principles of mathematical model development, the thesis builds a 
testable virtual military market model.  This model is not validated or tested in the space 
of this thesis and should undergo experimentation.  Next, this thesis walks through an 
intelligence use case and presents a number of testable hypotheses for model validation. 
Two appendices are included, the first discusses decision making in markets by 
taking existing decision making tools to show how the cycle of information can be 
improved for the decision making commander within market transaction space.  The 
second appendix is a briefing that highlights the key points of the VMM and the 
intelligence use case.   
 




II. COMMUNICATIONS ENABLED STRUCTURES 
This chapter reviews the need for alternative command, control, communications, 
and collaboration (C4) to better achieve the tenants of Network Centric 
Warfare/Operations (NCW or NCO).  The advancement of communication enabled 
networks and the alternative organizational structures, such as internal markets that can 
establish C4 relationships, that emerge are important concepts behind this model and are 
also explored.  This chapter then looks at lessons learned from commercial use of internal 
markets and examines commercial market practices.  The chapter finishes with an 
introduction to the principles of social network analysis and how these principles can 
indicate market locations. 
A. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
NCW is the Department of Defense’s cornerstone transformation concept to 
address new strategic and operational challenges.  The lead office for these efforts is the 
Office of Force Transformation (OFT) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  
OFT offers the following tenets of NCW:  
• A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
• Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness. 
• Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-
synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command. 
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness (OFT, 
2005A). 
The purpose of this market model is to help achieve these tenants.  Mission 
effectiveness is the ultimate goal of any military effort; therefore these tenants will never 
be far from the thinking through of this thesis development. 
1. Network-Centric Warfare 
OFT presents a number of ongoing projects/experiments and provided their status 
in an August 2004 Progress Report and its January 2005 publication-- The 
Implementation of Network-centric Warfare.  Ongoing efforts include: Blue Force 
Tracking, Horizontal Fusion, Sense and Respond Logistics, Common Relevant 
Operational Picture for Joint Forces, The Standing Joint Force Headquarters, 
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Collaborative Information Environment, Distributed Common Ground/Surface System, 
Dynamic Joint ISR Concept, and the Joint Interagency Coordination Group.  The services 
have their own NCW efforts: the Air Force’s Constellation Net, the Navy’s ForceNet, 
and Army’s Objective Force.  All of these initiatives are using some of the following 
OFT principles for implementing NCW: Information superiority, shared awareness, 
speed of command and decision making, self-synchronization, dispersed forces, 
demassification, deep sensor reach, and combine these principles to alter initial 
conditions at higher rates of change and reduce compartmentalization of process and 
functions between services. (OFT, 2005A). 
Of these principles, those that can be achieved technically are present in ongoing 
OFT projects (OFT, 2004A).  However, those that involve structural changes or changed 
operating concepts are not as evident.  Mr. John Luddy from the Lexington Institute 
provides a separate analysis of NCW efforts by examining operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  He looked at close air support, long range control of Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) as well as ground force supporting 
UAVs.  Communications initiatives like the Global Information Grid were identified as 
enablers of NCW.  He found both successes and failures in NCW efforts as well as room 
for growth.  Increased speed of targeting was a NCW positive; however fratricide and 
civilian collateral damage represented the other side of the coin.  He also found that 
information didn’t flow to the field as well it did coming back from the field (Luddy, 
2005). 
NCW doesn’t replace the leadership, training, and experience of the warfighter; 
the less tangible human aspects of warfighting are still critical.  In short, technology can 
only do so much.  NCW was demonstrated in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, however it wasn’t entirely validated.  Many of the 
transformation efforts mentioned so far are technology based, they haven’t yet changed 
strategies or planning tactics, and they haven’t taken advantage of decentralized C2 
(Luddy, 2005).  
New practices in knowledge and information management are critical for 
effective NCW.  Getting the right information, with the correct level of granularity, to the 
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tactical level and combatant commander is very important.  Providing vast quantities of 
data not tailored to the situation risks information overload for the operational 
commander, especially at the tactical level.  It’s a fine line between understanding a 
common operational picture and having too much data to sort and act upon, thus the 
development of common plans, operational concepts, and processes are just as important 
as the technology that makes them happen.  OFT recognizes this and tracks NCW 
changes in doctrine, organization, training, technology, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities at the same time.  However, not many ongoing initiatives focus 
on these human aspects of NCW.  
Luddy commented on this relationship between technology and culture and 
presented some shortages in NCW:   
Network-centric operations require technology, but they ultimately rely on 
people and organizations. As technology improves, the military must 
make similar advances in its institutions, processes, and culture.  Analysts 
and practitioners alike agree that the human aspects of military operations-
-training, doctrine, and leadership development--still need to change 
(Luddy, 2005, p.12).   
In other words, as NCW progresses, new concepts that utilize the full range of 
NCW strengths must be established.  Direct connections to these principles will be shown 
for this market force model by the end of this thesis. 
In their 2004 summer study On the Transition To and From Hostilities, the 
Defense Science Board (DSB) recognized a number of DOD capability shortfalls 
including: stabilization and reconstitution capabilities; strategic communications; 
knowledge, understanding, and intelligence for the 21st century; identification, location, 
and tracking for asymmetric warfare.  The DSB report memorandum advocates for “a 
new approach that will establish systematic ways to access and coordinate the vast 
amount of knowledge both within and outside DOD.”  One critical element is 
“intelligence reform that allows analysis to drive collection and fosters a more integrated 
community.”  Many of these “capability” shortfalls may actually be “process shortfalls”, 
and if looked at differently, some of our current force capabilities may be able to step up 
to meet some of these needs.  A new process approach to make this possible is central to 
this thesis and may help achieve the DSB’s recommendation for the intelligence 
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community to organize and integrate resources around problems, as well as other 
recommendations.   
2. From Collaboration to Self Synchronization 
Today’s DoD network collaboration is epitomized by the Common Operational 
Picture (COP), a digital picture that identifies friendly and adversary forces usually seen 
at the Joint Forces Command level. The COP greatly enhances shared situational 
awareness for battlefield coordination.  It is also an example of how information is 
centralized and controlled at higher levels of command, enabled by NCW 
communications capabilities.  One unfortunate side effect of these capabilities has 
resulted in senior leadership micromanagement instead of properly placed information 
and resultant decentralized decision making.  
Networks allow for collaborative planning throughout the chain of 
command, which can develop more effective plans faster. But the same 
collaboration allows senior level commanders to micromanage. Military 
operations rely on a properly functioning chain of command, where 
commanders at each level have a manageable span of control and can 
focus on operations at their appropriate level. As real-time battlefield 
information passes before senior commanders, there will be a temptation 
to over-direct small units and lose focus on broader objectives. One of the 
U.S. military’s greatest strengths is the initiative of small-unit 
commanders; if these commanders grow accustomed to centralized control 
from above, they may grow hesitant and indecisive (Luddy, 2005, p. 11). 
 
The DOD needs to take full advantage of networked communications capabilities 
including the benefit of decentralized capacity and the full power of the network.  
Network theory offers at least two measurements of communications capability:  Moore’s 
Law about information storage and processing capacity doubling every 18 months and 
Metcalfe’s Law about the value of the network as the square of the number of nodes 
present.  Could the power of NCW ever be determined so simply?  Probably not, 
however a simple correlation would show that the capabilities enabled by NCW are not 
being fully achieved.  This criticism is being realized and is the subject of a recent 
Information Age Transformation Series Book entitled Power to the Edge: Command and 
Control in the Information Age.   
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Power to the edge is about changing the way individuals, organizations, 
and systems relate to one another and work.  Power to the edge involves 
the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organization or, in the 
case of systems, edge devices…Moving power to the edge implies 
adoption of an edge organization, with greatly enhanced peer-to-peer 
interactions.  Edge organizations also move senior personnel into roles 
that place them at the edge…Command and control become unbundled 
(Albert & Hayes, 2003, p.5). 
This book, a Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) publication, was 
written to explain why current C4 concepts, organizations, and systems fail to meet 
today’s needs.  The power to the edge concept calls for commanders to establish the 
prerequisite initial conditions that enable decentralization including enterprise wide 
understanding of commander’s intent, dynamic resource allocation, and rules of 
engagement.  Along with quality information, shared situational awareness, and 
competence these initial conditions are really the basic elements of trust (in information, 
personnel and equipment) that are required to successfully implement new C4 methods.  
C4 are critical to all forms of warfare and are not treated lightly because they span all 
four domains of warfare (physical, information, cognitive, and social).  Historically, the 
least centralized approaches to C4 have used mission specific directives, where decisions 
were left to subordinates on how to achieve them.  However, control-free C4 has been 
rarely used in military warfare since communications capabilities have been available.  
The goal of the power to the edge concept is to re-enable the NCW tenant of self 
synchronization.  This will be possible where circumstances allow its realization; on the 
other hand, central decision making will continue to be merited for situations where the 
prerequisite conditions have not been established (Albert & Hayes, 2003). 
One specific communications capability, the internet protocol allows changes in 
knowledge management from a push to a “post and smart pull approach.”  Alberts and 
Hayes show how this changes the burden of determining information relevance/utility 
from the information owner/producer to the information user and make both suppliers 
and consumers smarter (2003).  Information age processes tap collective knowledge and 
collaboration, rather than relying on single decision makers.  These collaborative 
processes have been shown to be efficient and more likely to produce better solutions and 
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decisions.  The following minimum organizational characteristics and capabilities are 
required to complete military operations effectively: 
• The ability to make sense of the situation 
• The ability to work in a coalition environment including nonmilitary 
partners 
• Possession of the appropriate means to respond 
• The ability to orchestrate the means to respond in a timely manner 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 98). 
These capabilities will be the determinants of successful strategies that utilize the 
full power of the network for both the system and human side of the equation and 
measures of the organizations power.  These are the types of capabilities needed to 
achieve the deficiencies described in chapter 1 of this thesis.  Alberts and Hayes 
summarize that the reason for moving power to the edge is to increase organizational 
power:   
This additional power is related to a corresponding increase in 
organizational agility.  The source of the increased power comes from (1) 
an improvement in an organization’s ability to bring all of its information 
and all of its assets to bear, instead of only a fraction of its information and 
assets, and (2) the ability to recognize and take advantage of fleeting 
opportunities (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p.213).  
Decentralized or de-coupled C2 is both possible and desirable with our 
communications enabled networks.  What is left to determine is what form of 
decentralized organization can be used and when and where is it appropriate vice 
traditional C2 hierarchies, or some mix of the two?  This subject is examined in the next 
section. 
B. DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION THEORY 
New organization forms are needed to take advantage of that the advances in 
communications allow and achieve the tenants of NCW.  John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt recommend coupling both organizational forms with available technology in 
their Swarming & the Future of Conflict book (2000).  New roles for middle management 
and organizational flattening have proven successful in commercial business processes 
and may help the military attain effectiveness in planning and operations not present 
today.   This section covers basics organizational forms and then demonstrates new 
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hybrid structures enabled by advanced communications.  The chapter finishes with a 
discussion of the Sense and Respond Logistics (S&RL) project which takes advantage of 
existing business processes and market principles. 
1. Mintzberg’s Organizational Forms 
Henry Mintzberg defines organizational forms based on the environmental 
complexities and pace of change (uncertainty) that an organization is part of: 
• Machine Bureaucracy: complexity is simple, stable environment.  Uses the 
coordination mechanisms of standardization of work processes and/or outputs. 
• Entrepreneurial Startup: complexity is simple, dynamic/changing 
environment.  Uses the coordination mechanism of direct supervision. 
• Professional Organization:  complex, stable environment.  Uses the 
coordination mechanisms of standardized skills and/or norms. 
• Adhocracy:  Complex, dynamic environment.  Uses the coordination 
mechanism of mutual adjustment (Beshears, 2005). 
The Apollo 13 response team is a classic illustration of an adhoc teams formed to 
meet a purpose.  DOD Joint Task Forces, at least initially, are adhocracies of various 
personnel and assets gathered to focus their efforts on a particular operation.  Within this 
taxonomy, markets are in the quadrant of adhocracy in highly complex environments that 
are constantly changing.  Markets offer a decentralized structure; they are not really 
organizational forms at all, but transaction spaces between individuals and organizations 
that focus relationship and exchanges to meet requirements.   
Because of their decentralized control and use of mutual adjustment, both 
adhocracy and markets might as well be evil terms when used in the military context.  
Mutual adjustment is achieved between solution provider and requirement demand.  It is 
important to understand that in many cases adhocracy works only in the company of 
other organizational forms, this is true in the case of market mechanisms.  Markets exist 
between existing organizational entities.  Markets do not replace participating 
organizations and they may not change the internal structures/processes of participating 
organizations at all.  Their use as alternatives for C4 is discussed next. 
2. Communications Enabled Structures 
To keep up with the challenges of the information age, new strategies for 
organization and command and control are needed.  Actual strategies to accomplish this 
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transition are yet to be presented.  This thesis looks outside of DoD literature for 
examples and ideas of how to bring decentralization to the military forces.  
In his book, The Future of Work, Thomas W. Malone discusses alternative 
organizational types.  He illustrates a paradox in communications capabilities that both 
drove centralization of societies, from bands to monarchies; and today allows for 
decentralized democracies.  He argues that this model for social structure change can be 
applied to businesses.  Decisions to decentralize are made when the benefits of increased 
freedom, motivation and flexibility are greater and more advantageous than the increased 
communications infrastructure costs to do so. Malone outlines four types of 
organizational structures that take advantage of decentralization:  loose hierarchies, 
democracies, external markets, and internal markets (2004).  This thesis develops the idea 
of internal DOD markets for efficient and effective decision making.  
How do internal markets work?  Markets have been around since early history.  
The concept of a market is that buyers and sellers meet to exchange goods or services.  
Prices in markets are most often determined by supply and demand.  The concept of 
internal markets involves getting solutions from existing organizational resources and 
personnel using a buyer’s market approach .  The communications structure of markets is 
an “all channel network” where both existing relationships and new relationships can be 
formed.  Competitive decisions are reached by mutual agreement and incentives to 
participate are usually to maximize your profits (more income than expenses).   
Some companies are now establishing more formal internal markets.  For 
example, Hewlett-Packard has developed a market for new ideas from its employees.  
Any employee can submit a new idea to a senior management board.  The board 
determines funding for the most promising ideas.  The idea becomes a project and is 
posted for employees to volunteer to work on; the project leader determines who works 
on the project.  This internal market facilitates innovation and aligns skill by the project 
and makes formal reorganization unnecessary.  A more explicit market would be present 
if the board allocated operating funds based on the projects, and employees receive their 
income and/or bonuses with this method (Malone, 2004). 
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Exchanging information is another example of an internal market.  One example 
of an information market uses knowledge of the participants to make future predictions, 
this market doesn’t involve buying or selling products or services-- its more like taking 
bets about the future.  The idea is about the “wisdom of crowds” or as this thesis suggests 
the knowledge and power of the many.  The DOD tried out an “idea futures market” in 
2003, but that was a public relations disaster (Malone, 2004).  However, demand based 
knowledge sharing with proper incentives can be very effective to capture organizational 
wisdom, and are untried.  
Malone and other MIT colleagues have simulated internal market models for 
manufacturing firm capacity.  They were trying to explore the possibility that capacity 
could be allocated more effectively with a decentralized market process.  In the 
simulation, Malone’s team reached nearly perfect efficiency.   
There are several advantages of internal markets.  First, everyone can see the 
whole picture, not just the planners.  In the manufacturing example, if a factory goes 
down unexpectedly, the value of factory capacity elsewhere goes up.  The other facilities 
find it in their interest to take some of the failed factory’s work.  Next, the ability to adapt 
to changes, flexibility, and speed of decisionmaking are all increased.  When new 
situations or requirements are presented, more minds can work the problem and options 
can be explored simultaneously.  Market forces make resource allocation very efficient 
by meeting the needs of as many as possible. 
Motivation to participate in the market can be achieved with proper incentives—
example incentives include compensation, bonuses, or promotion material.  Increased 
autonomy and creativity can often be incentive enough for many cases.  Internal markets 
for organizations can be for products, services, or information.  Historically, markets are 
established for different reasons.  Here is a summary of market functions: 
A forum for exchange: This is perhaps the most classical definition of a 
market: It is to enable buyers and sellers to find each other. Town bazaars 
and stock markets would fall under this label. 
An arena for competition: The structure of competition may of course 
vary depending on the number of buyers and sellers but the primary 
function of a market appears to be the cultivation of sufficient amount of 
competition to ensure economic efficiency. 
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An avenue for choice: Economic efficiency is only meaningful to the 
extent people can exercise choice – markets allow individuals, at least in 
theory, to make the kind of consumption choices they prefer. Prices 
capture this information and direct the production of goods and services. 
A process for endorsement/external validation: Markets are powerful 
mechanisms for endorsing and validating (or rejecting) product and 
service offerings. Markets gather information from a number of 
individuals and aggregate this information. 
A mechanism for resource allocation: Due to the signaling effects of 
markets, resources become allocated toward their most efficient use. 
Although in theory the allocation processes are continuous, in practice 
corporate strategic planning and capital budgeting cycles render such 
decision making an annual event hence slowing down resource allocation 
adjustments in the market place. 
A kind of social network: Markets exist within the social context of a 
particular culture, defined by a set of institutions, and historical 
evolutions. To function, markets are supported by social networks of 
brokers, financial and other intermediaries, buyers, and sellers (Välikangas 
& Hamel, 2001, p.5-6). 
Each of these functions provides different reasons to establish internal markets.  
Combining Malone’s internal markets with the ideas of Mintzberg’s organizational 
forms, virtual markets are transaction spaces that facilitate “practiced adhocracy”.  In 
other words, they routinize the process of presenting problems to markets and solving 
them with market provided solutions.  The Sense and Respond Logistics model presented 
next illustrates market principles being utilized for resource allocations.  This thesis 
builds a military model to use internal markets for C4. 
3. Sense and Respond Logistics 
One project being pursued by the OFT is the S&RL project.  Intended to close the 
growing gap between the logistics community and NCW combat systems.  Without being 
named a market the S&RL project utilizes many “market like” mechanisms. The S&RL 
project is described as: “knowledge-enabled, demand driven” where: 
• Support networks are dynamic 
• Negotiations-based relationships are the basis for changing rule sets  
• Networks are robust and difficult to analyze or attack 
• Distributed, adaptive operations are supported (OFT, 2004B, p.16).    
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The goals of S&RL are to increase logistic robustness, commander’s flexibility on 
dynamic battlefields, and logistics agility to react quickly to environmental and new 
mission changes.  S&RL borrows the sense and response adaptive managerial framework 
originally developed by IBM.  The S&RL idea takes advantage of networked 
infrastructures, but also goes to the next level of operations support based on knowledge 
based demand networks.  The prime metric for S&RL is speed/quality of effects.  S&RL 
combines NCW theory and Joint Adaptive Expeditionary Warfare practices by taking 
advantage of network theory, complex adaptive systems, and chaos theory (OFT,  
2004B). 
This project has another noteworthy corollary to this research.  S&RL has taken a 
business practice, related it to the military environment, and developed relative concepts 
to be used by the military.  OFT’s summary of S&RL’s commercial ideas supporting 
NCW, the adaptation needed for the military operations, and finally its operational 
concepts are presented in a May 2004 concept paper.  
A couple of observations are interesting about the S&RL concept.  First, when 
taking commercial principles and applying them to the military context, careful 
consideration should be taken when making the concept fit the military environment.  
Second, while S&RL has not been called a market enabled program, it certainly fills 
many of the market roles described earlier by Välikangas & Hamel.  Take for example 
this one resultant concept from the military application of this business process: 
Networked adaptive logistics supported by a community of software 
agents that represent logistics suppliers, consumers, and resources 
• Sense and respond mechanisms identify (sense), request (demand), and 
support (supply) logistics needs 
• Full battlespace perspective of potential and opportunistic consumers, 
suppliers, and logistics transportation and distribution (including 
logistics resources outside the supply chain) 
• Using situational awareness and commander’s intent (plans, orders, 
tasks, effects, targets) to assess, prioritize, and reduce risk in S&RL 
• Using feedback, lessons learned, and experience from the agents to 
adapt the logistics effort, primarily through continuous planning, short-
term supply chain optimization, and supply chain event management 
(OFT, 2004B). 
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  Demand driven consumers, supplier provided resources, information exchange, 
avenues for choice, resource allocation, and the presence of technical and human network 
are all present in S&RL. S&RL utilizes “agents” that are acting in a virtual transaction 
space.   Additionally, S&RL C2 relies on distributed decision making, local self 
synchronization, shared situational awareness, and speed of command.  Perhaps the 
principle of using virtual markets is not so inconceivable for military forces; it may 
already be in development in the logistics community. 
C. LESSONS FROM INDUSTRY 
This section illustrates the use of internal market systems by commercial and non-
governmental organizations.  It also presents the functional aspects of commercial virtual 
markets. 
1. Internal Markets in Industry  
IBM poses the following question about the internal markets:  “If free markets 
allocate resources and set prices so efficiently, why not build market mechanisms inside 
corporations—to make them work better from the inside out?” (IBM, 2004)   Actually 
some corporations have been very successful with internal markets.   British Petroleum, 
Intel, and Ford Motor Company have successfully used the concepts of internal markets 
to enhance operations.  Certainly introducing markets into existing hierarchies can be 
difficult.  However, a 2001 paper by Välikangas and Hamel present some case studies of 
traditional hierarchies that have developed internal markets successfully.   
The World Bank Development Market Place was a market set up in 2000; the 
market was a two day event that generated ideas about grassroots development options.  
The World Bank’s traditional bureaucratic thinking was successfully overcome by 
making $300 million available to about 300 projects presented in this marketplace.  The 
marketplace received ideas from all over the world and had good results.  In 2001, four 
projects of the nine strategic initiatives ongoing at the World Bank were introduced in 
this market (Välikangas & Hamel, 2001). 
Royal Dutch/Shell’s Exploration and Production division has an innovation 
process called GameChanger.  GameChanger solicits ideas from Shell employees, 
selected universities, and partners; and uses and operational budget of .1% of the 
division’s earnings in 2000.  GameChanger successfully produced four of the five largest 
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growth opportunities for the company.  Key to the success of GameChanger was both its 
connections to, and independence from, the rest of the organization.  IBM’s alphaWorks 
is unique because it reaches out to software developers outside the organization, allows 
them to download new code and expand it into technology for a free evaluation period, 
and offer feedback on the code.  Developers are motivated to work with the code to 
possibly get a head start on developing new technology, while IBM gets important 
developer feedback and secure loyalty among developers.  This market pull has increased 
the software deployment process from two/three years to six months.  The authors 
summarize that the hierarchies of the industrial age will be replaced with structures like 
markets that facilitate innovation (Välikangas & Hamel, 2001). 
How difficult is it to set up internal markets?  Charles Plott, a California Institute 
of Technology economist, presents four difficulties presented by markets: 
• Speed. A market can react too slowly. People must have incentives to 
post information early and not wait until the last minute to bet on the 
winner. 
• Visibility. How much visibility should participants have into the 
bidding process? The ability of bidders to see what others are willing 
to pay will affect bidding behavior. 
• Timing. Should bidders be allowed to change prices after their initial 
posting? When will the market be open?  
• Participants. Should non-experts be allowed to participate? Plott's 
research shows that speculators can improve the performance of 
markets that predict future results. ‘It makes the market deeper and 
reduces variation,’ he says. ‘When speculators read how other people 
bid, they act like grease to make the system work more smoothly’ 
(IBM, 2004).  
These successful implementations of markets in traditional hierarchies are a good 
sign that markets can find a home in hierarchies, even one as rigid as the military.  
However, these difficulties along with military specific constraints & restraints need to be 
considered and either mitigated or overcome during market development. 
2. E-Bay and Elance 
This section describes how commercial virtual markets function.  A very well 
know virtual market is E-Bay:  It is basically a sellers market, self depicted as “the 
world’s online marketplace.”  Now look at E-Bay a little more analytically--what makes 
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it work?  How is trust established to assure transactions?  The 17 page user agreement 
provides clauses applicable to both buyers and sellers.  Trust is partially established and 
provisioned for by the site.  The buyer and seller have a “performance” feedback metric 
that assures both sides can be counted on to deliver the goods.  If a buyer or seller 
receives a cumulative negative feedback, they may be suspended from participating on 
eBay. Additionally, a payment service called “PayPal” provides the buyer $1,000 
protection on qualified listings and takes care of the payment between buyer and seller.  
When a buyer registers with the eBay site the following benefits are offered: a 
personalized shopping page; a place to save searches; notifications of most-wanted items; 
access to last minute bargains, and PayPal buyer protection (E-Bay, 2005). 
Elance is not as well known, but is closer to what the VMM is modeled for. 
Elance is a buyer’s market that presents projects (tasks) and solicits bids from service 
providers to accomplish those tasks.  The idea of a buyer’s market is very powerful, it 
reverses the responsibility of finding products or solution from the buyer to the seller.   It 
is a demand driven market that is similar to what is known in the DOD as a request for 
proposal.  It also offers “performance metrics” of both the purchaser of services and the 
solution provider.  To initiate a project the steps are simple: 
• Create a buyer account (1st time buyers only) 
• Describe the project; select a service category, set budget, start date 
and schedule 
• Authenticate yourself with a credit card 
• Publish your project to the marketplace (invite prospective sellers) 
• Receive competitive bids 
• Manage the work (Elance, 2005) 
Off the shelf solutions can be browsed on Elance.  For example if you are looking 
for a translation of a text, press releases, speeches, or a technical writing, just browse the 
category writing and translation for service providers.  Buyers can read the feedback and 
selling stats for each of the providers as well.  This feedback is critical for buyers who do 
not have previous business experiences with the providers.  The feedback forum provides 
the earnings report, number of projects accepted and number of feedback reviews.  The 
feedback summary provides a score from 1-5 in six areas: quality of work; 
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responsiveness; professionalism; subject matter expertise; adherence to cost; and 
adherence to schedule and a cumulative average.  Another way that Elance increases trust 
between buyer and seller is called a select marketplace, where the buyer is required a 
deposit to post the project, and select sellers are identified with gold icons behind their 
listing in the market.  Select sellers and buyers behave according to Elance criteria: 
buyers have minimum bid amounts, sellers have been verified through a trust partner 
such as US Search or SquareTrade.  These services check service provider’s records such 
as licenses, references, academic degrees, employment history and skill certifications 
(Elance, 2005).  Elance’s Quickstart Guide that explains how to sell services on the site: 
• Service providers register with the site and list the categories of work 
they provide; they develop profiles in those categories and create 
optional portfolios of previous work. 
• Determine what subscription services they are interested in ranging 
from: Free Courtesy Elance Yellow Pages listing to Select 
Professional Package includes all features of Elance 
• Service  providers then browse submitted projects, using filters based 
on company capabilities; they can sign up for new project email alerts 
• Companies may receive invitations for bids from prospective 
customers;  They place virtual bids. 
• Screen Projects-review the buyer’s Elance history and feedback on 
Elance; Clarify the project-post questions on project clarifications 
board; Communication during the bid process in an Elance Private 
Message Board 
• If a service provider wins the bid, they can then accept the project 
• Establish direct communication with the buyer—has optional use of 
Elance Private Message Board to maintain a written record  
• Deliver product through the message board and invoice the buyer 
through Elance 
• Receive payment and withdraw funds from Elance account (Elance 
Training Manual, 2005). 
These procedures and validations provided by eBay and Elance form a virtual 
environment where trust can be established from long distances, and parties otherwise 
unrelated can negotiate price and service acceptable to each other.  Some of these 
functions will be very useful in a military market, others will not.  Much like eBay, 
Elance is a marketplace that performs worldwide.  The military market model will start 
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with the Elance template and then translate the features and ideas into its military 
equivalent--sometimes adding or removing features, sometimes changing approaches to 
meet the operational requirements of conflict.  Several of the features described above 
will be especially useful in military markets.  For example, email or other types of 
notifications of certain projects that fit the organizations profile, and the invitations to 
sellers from prospective buyers or brokers to bid.  In some cases, the military markets 
may take advantage of more automated solutions were the operational risk of an 
information exchange is low, in this case the military market may be set to respond to 
information needs automatically.  Unlike commercial markets were consumers always 
want to make the final decisions, time to respond in conflict or handling routine mission 
transactions may be automated where the transaction is just recorded in the market. 
Another noteworthy observation about successful commercial virtual markets, they 
provide conditions and trust factors that should be considered when setting up a DOD 
virtual marketplace. 
The next section shows how organizational social network analysis can point the 
way for market location and illustrate the structure of existing task networks. 
D. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The location for military markets may be determined by where the decision 
making commander sits.  A more robust method to validate this would use social network 
analysis to determine market location, participants, and information flows/needs.   
Social network analysis (SNA) is the mapping and measuring of 
relationships and flows between people, groups, organizations, animals, 
computers or other information knowledge processing entities. The nodes 
in the network are the people and groups while the links show 
relationships or flows between the nodes. SNA provides both a visual and 
a mathematical analysis of human relationships (Krebs, 2005). 
SNA can be used to study an existing organization and provide a summary of the 
network connections related to knowledge management, task/process accomplishment, 
and decision making time.  The results of a SNA often reveal connections not reflected in 
the formal organization chart.  Answering such questions as: 
• Where are the key decision made? 
• Who are the experts? 
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• Who are the organization’s innovators? 
• What external links are present?  
• What are the internal organizational links? 
• What requires leadership interaction? 
• Are the right connections in place? (Krebs, 2005) 
SNA produce network metrics that can facilitate network optimization.  For 
example finding a node’s centrality can help measure the importance of the node, or 
determine how removed a node is from the main organization.  In a market, a node with 
few connections would probably be a specialist of some sort.  Nodes with many 
connections are often called hubs or connectors.  Two other social network measures are 
betweenness and closeness; both indicate the relative power of the node’s location.  
Betweenness measures control of flows on the network: how many paths go through the 
node?  Closeness describes how quickly one node can reach all others on the network.  A 
high score for control and easy access are good indicators of at least informal power.  
Finally, for analysis, network capacity refers to the ability to tap any knowledge, skills, 
and resources of the network (Krebs, 2005).   
A SNA of current military tasks and operations is useful to study the network 
structure of current tasks and C2.  SNA provides indicators of where to best place a 
potential market based on central hubs and communication links.  The market location, or 
actually the links to the market, will ultimately determine how effective and efficient the 
market will perform.  Links to remote capability may be just as valuable as the links to 
currently engaged forces.  The mapping of an organization’s normal tasks produces “off 
the shelf” solutions for task accomplishment.  These are usually presented in profile 
and/or portfolio pages, the organization may present these normal solutions or develop 
new ones either based on them or from scratch.  To develop “off the shelf” solutions, first 
identify the routine or normal tasks accomplished by the organization.  Next, for each 
task identify the lead on the task, the team membership, resources used, and 
outside/inside organization connections necessary to complete a task.  The creation of off 
the shelf solutions provides a perspective of an organization’s ‘as is’ operational task 
network.  The network maps can be reviewed for task links, hubs, and decision making 
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nodes.  In this manner SNA can be used to understand current operations and provide 
indicators of necessary market participants. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The DOD is just starting to realize that it is time to take advantage of “the other 
side” of network warfare, the power of distributed knowledge and decision making.  
Investments in the global information grid, the COP, and other NCO principles have 
opened up the opportunity to better achieve all of the tenants of NCW.   Currently NCO 
uses the concept of sharing and fusing information, but it does not necessarily taking 
advantage of the entire network’s knowledge or experience.  Instead of a few minds 
working a problem, networks allow the input from various dispersed network users.  The 
idea of exploiting dispersed knowledge or isolated capabilities are rarely considered in 
the military realm.  “Lanes in the road” often keep DOD forces solving problems the 
same way, based on previous operations and without considering the economies of new 
approaches.  These lanes are often responsible for the lack of new approaches and 
capability shortfalls as recognized by the Defense Science Board, CCRP and the OFT.   
Corporate America has faced its own information age challenges and has started 
to develop transformational businesses practices that take advantage of disperses 
knowledge and new virtual business opportunities.  Corporations are starting to utilize 
information pull-orientated processes.  In a similar fashion, NCW thus far has utilized its 
connectivity to push information in vast quantities.  This type of information sharing is 
useful but not entirely efficient or more importantly effective.  The information isn’t 
tailored to the individual, situation, or context.  Thus, the consumers are left to translate 
the information and in some cases suffer from information overload.  Smart pull of 
information can be accomplished in a knowledge or information market.  In this case the 
consumer submits specific requirements for information and gets back information from 
a variety of sources that answer the specific requirement; this is the capability of just one 
type of market. 
An Esquire magazine article about Donald Rumsfeld, outlines a Navy pilot 
program that plans to test the possibility of an E-Bay type auction system being used in 
conjunction with the civilian National Security Personnel System.  This system would 
have employees negotiate in web spaces for available jobs (Barnett, 2005).  Perhaps the 
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DOD is starting to scratch the surface of getting things done using alternative C4 
structures.   
This chapter concludes that both operational requirements are present that can 
take advantage of internal markets, and that the communication enabled structures are 
present to make that possible.  The rest of this thesis involves applying the concepts 
covered in this chapter to the military, building a virtual military market model, and 
walking through a use case that will illustrate how and where internal markets can fit 
military operations. 
Moving on to the question behind this thesis:  how can virtual internal markets be 
used by DOD to improve the solutions and information available for the decision making 
commander?  The reasons for using markets are diverse, but they boil down to 
effectiveness and efficiencies.  Markets have traditionally give strong indicators of 
resource and capabilities requirements, show resource surplus, indicate the need for new 
collaborative connections, provide new solutions, and help vanquishing outdated 
solutions.  The new economics of information add greater perspective to market solutions 
and make them possible in places not previously seen.  The next chapter starts to develop 
a virtual military market model with hopes that the model can be used to test the 




























III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
How can virtual internal markets be used by the DOD for command, control, 
collaboration, and coordination (C4)?  This chapter develops the elements/components of 
an internal military market system.  The first question to develop the market concept is 
simple:  What are the macro market variables needed for a virtual market?  These macro 
variables help a market builder identify the essential elements required for market 
formation.  The second part of this section presents micro transaction variables; it starts 
with observations about functional commercial virtual markets, and then starts to 
translate those observations into the operational military environment.    
A.  MACRO MARKET VARIABLES AND COMPONENTS 
These variables are prerequisites to market creation.  These variables need to be 
developed prior to market development. 
 1.   Identification of Buyers/Consumers and Demand 
Markets exist to meet some demand, without demand they will not perform.  
What is needed by whom?  In commercial markets demands range from a consumer’s 
need for products, loans, homes, and entertainment just to name a few.  In the 
commercial world virtual market creation is about identifying a niche market.  This is the 
most essential market component, and the starting point for market development.   
Translated in the military, commanders may need information or course of action 
proposals for operations. Operations personnel also have information and resources 
needs.  Wherever operations are engaged and where decisions and resource allocations 
are being made are likely market focus points in the military.   
After determining the consumers and their demands to be met by a market, other 
questions follow.  Is this a new demand, a niche market?  Does this demand need its own 
market or should it be added to existing market(s)?  For example, has a new operation or 
crisis emerged?  What type of market is this?  In other words is the demand in the market 
functionally orientated such as intelligence, operations, or logistics?  Or, does the market 
represent all of these needs and is unique by some discrete geographic or topical 
demographic?  These questions help define the location of the market in virtual 
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representation.  Does it get included as a sub market of an existing market, or does it get 
listed as a stand alone new market.  
2.   Identification of Sellers/Solution Providers 
Who or what organizations can provide solutions to the demands presented by 
consumers?  Markets should present all possible solution providers available for a 
particular market.  Markets have utility only when individual demands can be met by 
solution providers available on the market. 
3.   What is Exchanged? 
The virtual military market may involve exchanges of information, data, 
feedback, and operational solutions.  Basic market mechanisms involve the exchange of a 
statement of requirement from the consumer and a way to present a potential solution and 
cost basis from a solution provider.  Templates are easily constructed in virtual markets 
for both of these that represent both buyer and seller information.   
Identifying the value attached to these exchanges can be as this thesis suggests a 
cost basis, discussed in more detail later; some sort of point system; or merely an 
accounting of all resources used.  The most important part of the value exchange in a 
military market is that its scale reflects a comparable measurement between market 
participants and resources.  If the cost basis is not used to determine value, and a point 
system used in its place, the point value should reflect the level of effort and resources of 
a given solution and be comparable to other transactions. 
4.   Determine Incentives for Solution Providers 
The buyer has a natural incentive to participate in the market; the buyer needs 
something.  What motivates the seller to meet that need?  In the commercial market, that 
involves a profit motive.  Profitability doesn’t matter to the DOD; however effective 
distributed operation capabilities especially for decision making and information sharing 
does matter. It may be enough incentive to participate with the knowledge that this is how 
successful operations are achieved.  Additional incentives come out of the record and 
aggregation of all transactions.  Here are example incentives for military markets:   
Exchange of Cost Basis:  A cost basis exchange with a transaction is probably an 
indirect incentive for participation in a military market.  Recording the cost basis for a 
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transaction doesn’t necessarily discriminate one solution from another in a particular 
transaction, and cost is not necessarily being advocated here as a means for choices 
between solutions.  Few military commanders would use cost to determine their choices 
in operations.  They are more interested in the success of the operation.   
Currently, the exchanged cost basis may never equate to dollars for an 
organization especially outside of DOD, perhaps with changed legislation the cost basis 
could be exchanged between U.S. government agencies in the future.  However, post 
operations market analysis makes the aggregated summary of transactions in combination 
with a cost basis extremely useful.  Within the DOD this information could be used by 
decision makers at all levels for determining DOD budgets and billets.  Market analysis 
can prove useful for decisions about weapon systems, and identify the need for new 
systems in response to EBO needs that couldn’t be met exactly.  For national agencies, 
this “score card” could be used differently.  The cost basis of whatever is being 
exchanged is a good starting point to establish a representation of market valuation; this 
is because perfect markets would exactly relate costs with price (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991).  
How to establish a cost basis is determined in market development. 
Ratings:  How am I doing?  Participation in the market helps develop a running 
total of how well solution providers are doing with feedback and performance indicators.  
Additionally, these ratings are very valuable to the decision maker when making a choice 
between solutions to evaluate the risks involved with solution choice.  Ratings and 
feedback can be very useful in assessing a solution for an EBO.  Markets can record 
metrics of how well a solution provider can meet exact effects being prescribed.  See 
Appendix A for additional discussion on military decision making.   
Status:  I was a participant!  The market provides a record of who did what, 
where, even from remote locations.  It tracks contribution and involvement.  The question 
“what have you done for me lately” will be very easily answered for commanders. 
These are all either direct or indirect incentives for DOD and outside 




5. Policy Needs and Broker Roles 
Demand drives the military market, and incentives entice solutions for those 
needs.  That doesn’t mean that the Laissez-Faire “invisible hand” of Adam Smith’s free 
markets perfectly coordinate these in every situation.  Social benefits, for example clean 
air and safety standards, are often unaccounted for in the commercial markets (Dixit & 
Nalebuff, 1991).  In military markets, this may be the case as well; the good of the entire 
military effort or specific operation may not be reflected in a singular transaction.  In a 
military market, policy exceptions, rules, and the roles of brokers are important to realize 
the exceptions of priority, time constraints, operational impacts, and other specific 
military market needs just as they are used in commercial markets.   
History has proved numerous cooperation and coordination mechanisms to meet 
the collective good and reach John Nash’s Pareto Optimal solution including: penalties, 
policy, law enforcement, and contract abatement procedures.  One type of market 
solution is to charge fees or tolls for the “harm” they cause to others in an open market.  
They are often “innocuous” enough, such as the rate of a toll road.  In this case time and 
money are traded based on a common value basis between the commuter participants 
who choose between driving and public transit (Dixit & Nalebuff., 1991). 
Brokers in markets help establish relationships between consumers and solution 
providers.  Their roles may vary, however they are often a critical intermediary between 
two parties, and are often the source of introduction between them.  Brokers in the 
commercial world are often licensed in their area of expertise.  The roles of brokers in the 
military market are similar to those roles in the commercial market.  Brokers may be tied 
to organizations, but their most valuable responsibility is to increase the number of 
successful transactions between buyer and seller.  Specifically, brokers often facilitate 
transactions that otherwise would not happen based on buyer or seller awareness.  
Brokers in both the commercial and military markets should be effective users of social 
network analysis; this combined with their specialty market expertise makes their roles 
indispensable and key to market success.  Market developers need to consider broker 
roles and skill sets carefully market by market.   
31 
The situations requiring policy or broker actions should be thought through for 
each military market during development.  These roles need to be further refined during 
experimentation or exercise.  In many cases, specifying the roles of brokers and their 
locations in the market can mitigate these issues.  In other cases, establishing a market 
policy to handle all such situations may be effective.  These policies and broker roles are 
important macro considerations and are implemented in micro transaction considerations.  
Examples of policies and broker roles are illustrated in the intelligence use case. 
6. Assumptions for Virtual Market Creation 
One basic assumption for the creation of a virtual market is access; in the case of 
a DOD command and control or intelligence markets this requires access to SIPRNET.  
For coalition environments, access is usually on a coalition network.  Another assumption 
that is part of market development is the improvement over other control and 
collaboration exchange mechanisms.  Assumptions about improvements are made at the 
macro level, and usually evaluated during model testing.  The measurable improvements 
of market mechanisms over traditional collaboration, control, and exchange mechanisms 
are very important to the consideration of virtual military markets.  
7. Summary 
These are the virtual market essential considerations and macro variables.  
Markets do not exist without each of these.  The next section illustrates the details that 
create functional virtual market transaction spaces.  It is important emphasize that when 
the macro variables of consumer, solution provider, identification of exchange and 
incentive for exchange are met, a market mechanism can solve the problem.  It is then 
just a matter of developing the transaction space. 
B. MICRO VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT  
This thesis uses the virtual market transaction space of Elance to begin to identify 
how to develop a DOD market, the idea being to not reinvent what already exists but to 
apply subtle changes to existing business models.  The Elance market offers numerous 
market components and variables, for example description of project, time for 
completion, performance ratings, competitive bids, project management participants, and 
others.  The following analysis presents DOD equivalents of these variables, discusses 
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their relationship to Elance where applicable, and determines what type of modeling or 
simulation is required for the individual market components. 
1. Statement of Requirement (Demand)  
Markets are demand driven, so what is needed from the market space?  In the 
Elance marketplace this is called posting a project.  Three types of needs are discussed 
here that are present in an operational military environment (by no means an exhaustive 
list of military requirements).  In each case a requirement template is developed to 
capture the requirement.  For the Joint Force Commander, one requirement is a solution 
for an effects based operation (EBO), another is an operational information requirement.  
The last requirement discussed here is an unplanned requirement during operations. 
• Effects Based Operations (EBO) -- this type requirement will be involved in 
campaign planning and operations where a normal planning cycle is 
accomplished.  EBO is a complicated consideration of actions, coordination, 
ripple effects and cascades (Smith, 2004).  For the purpose of this model, it 
will be assumed that a requirement has undergone full EBO analysis and has 
enough detail to be accomplished. 
• Information requirement-- information needs (intelligence) can be part of 
operational planning or unplanned intelligence requirements as operations 
proceed.  In the unplanned case the need is usually described by the operations 
personnel.  Information needs can be recurring in several ways: as automatic 
updates (daily products or analysis updates or changes), flags when updates 
are available, or for access to a database. 
• Unplanned requirements during operation-- these types of requirements 
emerge during the operation and are considered unplanned.  These 
requirements can be as simple as additional equipment requirements-- to a call 
for unplanned close air support, firepower, or troop deployments. 
These types of requirements drive the market and represent the single most 
important reason for creating internal DOD markets.  In other places this is called a 
demand driven network.  Some decision theory can be used to determine estimates of 
success for decision makers.  This type of analysis provides the basis for determining 
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what should be asked for in the requirement template.  See appendix A for a full 
discussion of decision theory contribution to the market model.  It is assumed that the 
requirements presented to the market reflect actual operational needs and meet the 
scrutiny of commander’s intent. 
2. Market Templates and Negotiation Space 
Each market must have useful templates for the consumer and solution provider 
respectively.  Elance and other commercial markets offer generic requirement templates; 
they also offer instruction on how to best state requirements that achieve the clearest 
results and provide examples.  Further requirement refinements are worked out in 
negotiations between the market participants after they are introduced usually in a virtual 
workspace.  This type of workspace is also used to keep track of solution progress. 
In the virtual military market these templates need to capture all of the essential 
components of requirements and carry them through the market process from 
presentation of a new requirement through completion of the operation.  Requirement 
refinements from negotiations should also be captured in historical template information.   
Solution templates should capture the information needed by the decision maker to make 
a choice among alternatives.   
3. Cost Basis or Other Value Determination 
In the Elance environment, potential service providers are asked to place bids on 
posted projects.  This bid reflects the value of time spent and resources used by a service 
provider solution in a competitive environment.  This may be simplified in the military 
market.  It would be difficult and cumbersome for a commander to attempt to state the 
sum of the costs of an operation that includes the costs of manpower, knowledge, 
equipment, sustainment, logistics, etc.  In the military market, the value of the transaction 
should equate to the cost basis of the information and resources used based on DOD 
approved resource tables.  The cost basis is automatically generated with the bid based on 
the relevant resources and time estimated by the solution provider and submitted with the 
bid.  Since perfect markets equate cost with price, using the cost basis as the transaction 
price is a simple valuation method.  In this way the cost basis is consistent throughout the 
market and changes only because of capacity and priority issues discussed later.     
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This cost basis relies on the accuracy of tables of values that represent the cost of 
the resources presented for the operation.  This cost basis submodel utilizes a “cost per 
resource hour” table of costs.  The value for the solution is automatically calculated with 
solution submission to the market and not proposed by the solution provider.  For 
operational packages, the cost basis for personnel, equipment, and resources are reflected 
on the proposal.  Then their value is taken from tables stating the hourly employment cost 
of each resource.  For a solution that requires 12 people, 2 tanks, a certain command and 
control package, and 6 hours to complete, the market cost module consults DOD tables to 
retrieve the cost of each stated resource for six hours. A unit’s “off the shelf” solution has 
a predetermined cost basis when employed “as is”, and should be posted on the unit’s 
portfolio page.  
The cost basis is automatically attached with all bids on the market, and is 
included in the final approved transaction based on the solution provider’s estimate of the 
amount of time, weapon system, other equipment, time, etc.  The cost basis is unlikely to 
contribute to solution selection; however that is up to the decision making commander.  
Perhaps the cost basis may become more important in the case of two solutions that have 
equivalent expected value or risk associated with them.  See discussion in Appendix A.  
As mentioned before this cost basis is more important to post market analysis than to 
individual operational decisions.   
In a similar manner the cost basis of information (intelligence) is from an 
established table of values, determined by the information source provider and within the 
global cost structure of the assets used.  For example all satellite imagery should cost a 
generic average price in the market for simplicity, except where the conditions warrant.  
In some cases the use of commercial imagery may be cheaper than that of national assets, 
the satellite used may be an exceptionally expensive system, or in some cases less costly 
such as TacSat assets (OFT, 2004B).   
An information solution provider will list their standard product prices on their 
profile portfolio page.  Every time a user gets a particular report, picture, or other analysis 
this is the cost assessed for the transaction.  The cost basis for a tailored report or analysis 
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will be presented by the solution provider by estimating analyst time and resources used 
much like an operational solution does. 
4. Performance Ratings 
Elance offers a six part rating scale described in chapter three of this thesis.  
Elance also presents a running dollar total of the company’s historical transactions over 
time, which is a good indicator of the demand for that organization’s solutions.  
Recording demand will be important in the military model   
Various measures are possible in military markets to show performance.  The 
most important measures of performance provide the decision making commander 
relevant information that helps in future decision making.  Four types of feedback criteria 
are discussed here; these are by no means complete list.  Additional ideas about 
performance metrics and how to improve commander’s decision criteria are presented in 
Appendix A.  
Here are examples of possible feedback criteria:  EBO achievement or need 
fulfillment, an after-action comparison of the total cost basis of all the resources 
employed compared with those presented in the proposal, the ability to execute on 
schedule or adjust to operational changes, and the ability to resolve conflict and 
accomplish risk mitigation.    
• Achievement of Effects Based Operations:  Was the objective attained?  In 
the Elance world the buyer either received a project the way they wanted it 
accomplished or not.  This is reflected in the feedback.  This model needs to 
establish a metric that represents the attainment of the objective, or the 
meeting of an information requirement.  It may do this by individual attributes 
involved in the solution. 
• Meeting Cost Basis Estimates:  Was the product or operational solution 
presented reasonably?  Very similar to Elance’s adherence to cost, were more 
or fewer resources used than expected?  This metric rates the unit’s ability to 
present accurate estimates of required resources needed for operations.  Post 
operation analysis would compare the actual operation with the estimated 
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operation provided by the solution provider.  This metric informs the 
operational commander just how well a unit can estimate its activities. 
• Schedule adherence:  Was the operation executed on schedule?  Elance has a 
metric for the project meeting its schedule.  In a similar fashion a military 
operation can be measured.  However, adaptability is also an important quality 
for military employment in the fog and friction of war.   It may be necessary 
to alter schedules to meet operational changes.  This needs to be considered in 
this metric as well. 
• Conflict and risk mitigation:  Was the task completed without creating 
conflicts with other employed forces in a synergistic and force multiplying 
way?  This metric is unique to the military.  Projects that are accomplished on 
Elance are generally stand-alone, “turn key” projects.  However, military 
operations are undertaken during continuing operation and need to be 
coordinated and deconflicted with other military units and/or other agencies.  
This category may be broken into a couple of metrics depending on specific 
mission attributes, and the unit’s ability to accurately present their risk for 
each of these.  See Appendix A for more discussion on this. 
Experimentation and/or simulation should help determine if a cumulative average 
should be established between these ratings or some sort of weighted accumulative score.  
In other words, are all of these factors equivalent?  The Elance model treats their metrics 
equally with a cumulative average.  How performance is measured is important feature of 
the market.  Additionally, some consideration about the entry performance rating of new 
solution providers needs to be determined.  Simulation and or experimentation should be 
used to explore the performance factor of new solution providers entering the market.  
Specific markets, and even specific solutions types may have different measures of 
performance and feedback.  It is important to maintain some level of equivalence about 
these measures so that they may be compared across the market.   
Feedback and performance measures are central to the improvement of the 
information for the decision maker and therefore require careful consideration when 
being developed for a market.  The measures involved in determining performance 
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should in no way be arbitrary, generic, or treated lightly by consumers or solution 
providers.  The market developer should consider the prerequisites of improved 
information for the decision maker and develop metrics that reflect this.  Consumers must 
understand that feedback does exactly that; their measures of performance and feedback 
provide other decision makers with estimations of how much trust and confidence they 
can expect of solution providers.  A scale of these quality measures needs to be 
predefined and used consistently in markets.  For example, a timeliness metric that 
measures the “on-time” delivery of a solution is shown in Table 1:  
Table 1. Scale of Performance- Timeliness 
Measure Quality measures of timeliness 
(5) Perfect On-time 
(4) Good Within a (pre-defined % time) with no mission/effort impact 
(3) Fair Outside of (pre-defined % time) with no mission/effort impact 
(2) Poor Delayed mission or effort 
(1) Inferior Caused mission/effort degradation or failure 
Quality feedback provides the decision making commanders with performance 
measures that tell them something about the solutions presented to them.  These 
performance metrics need to be carefully considered and written feedback should reflect 
the “why” of the rating.  One way to get all solution providers closer to “perfect” is 
through mission effects/impact feedback mechanisms.  These measures increase 
confidence in decision making and distributed operations.   
5. Time 
Time is a complex variable and market response may depend on the amount of 
information technology being used in the market.  For example, the Sense and Respond 
Logistics concept uses autonomous “agents” to initiate market transactions.  Time to 
respond may determine the limit of market mechanisms.  Certainly during “under fire” 
circumstances, markets may not meet the need for addition firepower.  Just how fast can 
the market respond: days, hours, minutes? This must be determined for each type of 
military market developed.   Time shouldn’t be a factor when using market for planning.  
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Time requirements for operational markets are somewhere between “must have it now” 
and “must have it when required”.   
Two measures of time that need to be captured in market requirements are time 
for proposals (bids) and time for solution delivery.  The ability to meet the proposal time 
may be a constraint of market mechanism use.  This variable should be refined, 
developed, and tested in simulation and exercises.  Real measures of timeliness and 
constraints should be developed for each market. 
6. Brokers 
The knowledge network and the effectiveness and placement of the broker within 
the market will contribute measurably to improved command decision making and are 
critical for model employment.  The broker’s knowledge will not be considered a 
measurable factor (or numerically represented) in model development, but should be 
considered when the model reaches experimentation or exercise.  Specific roles of 
brokers should be developed during model creation and experimented with during 
exercises.  As mentioned earlier, brokers may meet some of the policy needs of a market 
especially in matters of priority and time constraints.  The capabilities of brokers could 
influence the market significantly and should be experimented with in joint exercises and 
developed as a new acumen in the DOD.  In many cases broker roles supplant many 
layers of bureaucracy present in today’s command, control, communication processes. 
7. Market Participation and Location 
The Elance market is a ubiquitous market that allows participation by all 
registered buyers and subscription-paying solution providers that have access to the 
Internet.  Virtual commercial markets are established by creating a type of market 
(buyer/seller) and creating specific categories of service or product.   
These are very important considerations for virtual military markets.  Should all 
markets participate on one global website, with subcategories based on geographic 
location or type of operation?  Wherever possible, the virtual military markets should be 
in one transaction space like their commercial equivalents because this allows for ease of 
use and access.  The commander, analyst, solution provider, etc. should have everything 
available to them in one location.   
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Intelligence markets present classification difficulties.  One possible solution is to 
have the virtual military market resident on SIPRNET and record all transactions there.  
However, the actual information exchange may need to take place on a different 
classified network.  This would be equivalent to choosing between the Post Office and 
FedEx for product delivery and can be handled the same way.  Where this isn’t possible 
with a digital process, human actions are called upon.   
For the purpose of developing an initial market model, one market transaction 
space is assumed; all possible solution providers will have visibility of all resources and 
requirements in the market.  It is also assumed that all data exchanges will be 
accomplished at the same classification as the transaction space.  These assumptions can 
be refined as markets reach mature development. 
8. Unit Profiles 
In Elance a buyer can survey a list of service provider portfolios and solutions that 
are available in the market.  This often helps the buyer describe their project more 
clearly.  Elance profile pages provide service “templates” that outline the requirements 
statements to help buyers prepare a request for the particular requirement.   
In the military market, profiles will contain operational “category” information 
about a unit and or a unit’s products in the case of an intelligence organization.  This will 
facilitate quick searches for unit type and capabilities.  If a commander is looking for a 
particular air package participating in his market, a quick search of air assets will reveal 
those that are participating.  In the case of an Intel market, the profile reflects the types of 
information available from the provider and taskable assets.   
A unit’s “off the shelf” solutions should be included in their profile as portfolio 
items.  For example, an F-15 Squadron can provide a list of standard packages that it flies 
with.  The Squadron’s “off the shelf solutions”, include the number of airplanes, all 
personnel involved (including ground personnel necessary for the operation),  command 
and control and other system requirements (such as average Air Operation Center 
planning time required, AWACS use, special comms, etc.).  The off the shelf solutions 
would be described briefly and their cost basis would be listed in the portfolio.  Tailored 
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packages would be built from these generic solutions or developed from scratch when the 
situation is warranted.   
9. Resource and Unit Availability 
When a solution is presented in Elance, the buyer makes an assumption that the 
solution provider is available to provide the solution that was presented.  This is a self 
synchronization characteristic of markets.  This will be a military market assumption; the 
resources being presented are available for the operation at the proposed operation time 
and they are not being over utilized.  Demand and capacity counts should be used to 
monitor these behaviors in the military market for better decision making and to account 
for policy exceptions such as priority queuing rules and time sensitive requirements. 
At the same time, in the Elance market, the buyer is hopeful that a variety of 
solution providers present choices for the buyers needs.  The Elance market doesn’t really 
care if a particular solution provider doesn’t participate.  In the case that a solution is not 
presented during the bid cycle, the buyer’s needs will either have to be restated, 
individual solution providers may be solicited to bid, or the need remains unmet.   
The military market can use more traditional C2 relationships to assure that needs 
are met and that all solution providers are involved; broker roles can facilitate these 
needs.  However, such important market information such as lack of solution or 
availability should be handled by either changing market participation to increase 
resources, or finding new solutions to meet the needs.    This is where a talented broker 
can leverage their social and knowledge networks to invite new market participants or 
solicit new solutions from current participants.  This type of market information can be 
successfully used to evolve capabilities and establish self adjusting utilization metrics. 
10. Special Considerations 
After developing the market transaction space and mechanisms, it is important to 
consider what organizations and/or resources that may not do well in the market.  In these 
cases the market can reflect those demands in different ways or decision makers can 
acknowledge that these items are exceptions.  One case of a military asset that wouldn’t 
show high demand are nuclear weapons.  Thankfully, we haven’t used many of these.   
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Another type of special case is how much visibility to allow of a market, asset, 
requirement or solution.  In some cases some assets or requirements may need to be seen 
by only specific users.   Market visibility is a consideration for almost all markets.  
Operational markets may only be visible to assigned or invited individuals or 
organizations and DOD senior leadership. 
C. ESTIMATES OF IMPROVED DECISION MAKING 
Every virtual market that is created should be developed with this goal in mind.  
During market conception, estimates of specific improvements should be made.  Then 
during development and testing these estimates should be found valid or not.   
1. Market Mechanisms Work Together 
The interaction between bid prices and a performance factor is a critical 
relationship to understand in the Elance market.  In commercial markets a buyer deciding 
between service providers makes a choice based on the price presented and the 
performance factors.  The individual buyer determines if the risk of accepting a solution 
that costs less but has poor feedback than that of a higher bidder with better feedback.  
The interaction between these two variables creates a market decision.  This is where 
trust is essential; market mechanisms should help produce a decision basis.   
In the military market, a decision is usually made based on probability of an 
operation’s success.  The cost basis is not usually part of decision making for the most 
part in the military market.  However, the commander is interested in having the best 
possible course of action for a given problem.  Specific market mechanisms should be 
developed and employed based on the decision making strategy of the commander.  
These market mechanisms range from how the commander presents a requirement, to 
how a solution provider presents a solution and is rated on performance.  This market 
model is useful because the mechanisms can be increasingly refined to produce the type 
of information that is needed for effective decision making.  For more discussion on EBO 
decision making see appendix A.   
2. Post Operations and Transaction Analysis 
The improvement of decision making information for the operational commander 
is measured by the quality of information made available for operational decision 
making.  The second layer of improved decision making may be for force structure 
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decisions.  This thesis has not developed virtual military market analysis or error 
checking tools; however the aggregate of all of the transaction in a market can provide 
DOD senior leadership with excellent indications of asset value, the need for new 
capabilities, or shortages of existing resources.  Borrowing from commercial analysis, 
indexing and indicators can lead to value added decision making well above the 
operational level.  Determining how to deal with such market indicators will require 
strategic level decision makers to facilitate the changes needed.  This type of decision 
making isn’t simulated in the market model, but should be considered in new CONOPs, 
development of strategy, and for future study. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The complete market model needs to perform well to be considered for use in 
real-world military operations.  This is where both the principles of model development 
and the standards of new transformational concepts like Power to the Edge must be met.  
The market must self synchronize, produce solutions that make sense,  work in coalition 
environments, employ an appropriate means to respond, and orchestrate the means to 
respond in a timely manner.  These essential criteria create trust in market decision 
making and therefore make it useful for military operations.  
This chapter has presented the macro variable and many of the micro transaction 
variables required to develop a virtual military market.  The next chapter walks through 






IV.  INTELLIGENCE USE CASE 
This chapter takes the market model presented in the last chapter and applies it to 
the DOD intelligence process.  The Virtual Military Intelligence Market (VMIM) 
discussed here illustrates the consideration taken for the macro variables and micro 
transaction processes that are required to establish a virtual military market.  Why use the 
virtual military market for intelligence?  Or a more specific question, how does a market 
improve the intelligence process?  This is a fair question from intelligence professionals.  
This section addresses the application of the market model for the intelligence process, 
and presents measurable improvements for validation.  This use case takes market 
development through the steps of problem identification, assumption development, and 
market model development/interpretation for the intelligence process.  The last three 
steps of model development-- verification, implementation, and maintenance of the 
market model are not completed in this thesis. 
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
‘I could probably get more usable intelligence from a séance,’ quips one 
officer with recent Iraq experience. 
‘The intelligence community is so layered and so compartmentalized that 
the only secrets they keep are from themselves,’ says one Marine officer 
who has served in Iraq, speaking only somewhat in jest (Grossman, 2005). 
The intelligence community has a fair share of critics ranging from Congress to 
operational troops on the ground.  Expressions of intelligence deficiencies are pervasive.  
The 9/11 report summarizes two primary needs for the intelligence community:  the need 
for the community to restructure, and to increase information sharing with incentives 
(2004).  The following themes are found in most criticisms of the intelligence 
community: stop hording, change what is valued by the community, and change the 
culture from “need to know” to “need to share.”  Mark Lowenthal presents the following 
additional recommendations: 
• Create measures that show efficient analysis, collection, and 
operations support 
• Changed transactions processes & structures to meet the goal of agility 
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• Access to value added expertise that is flexible and has surge analyst 
capacity 
• Improved requirements process 
• Creation of intelligence reserve for crises 
• Properly balance redundancy and duplication for competitive analysis 
(Lowenthal, 2003) 
Similar changes to intelligence are needed at the operation level and for 
counterinsurgency.  Various authors recommend other intelligence reforms including: 
intelligence sharing out of stovepipes and increased focus on to attaining timely and 
relevant HUMINT information; intelligence officers need to increase their social network 
skills and establish relationships with counterparts in other organizations; and competing 
and alternative hypothesis need more consideration (Grau, 2004).  New intelligence 
structures are also called for that consider the protracted nature of counterinsurgency, and 
essentially become a global “network of networks” where all nodes are users and 
producers of intelligence (Sullivan & Bunker, 2002).    
Major General Scales (retired) offers the following lessons learned from 
Afghanistan:  the need for better culturally centric HUMINT and better “actionable” 
intelligence post kinetic phase.  Scales recommends changing the focus of the 
intelligence community to the tactical operator, as well as pushing intelligence collection 
and analysis downward or closer to the tactical operator, and the creation of global scout 
experts with area expertise (2004). 
The question that needs to be asked for the development of a military intelligence 
market is:  Can a virtual military intelligence market improve the intelligence process of 
today and start to address some of these concerns?  The following improvements are 
presented as testable hypotheses for the intelligence use case:     
• Increase focus on the intelligence consumer and provide tailored analysis for 
operational needs 
• Provide a common process and language for community transactions 
• Create a “one stop shop” for consumers & analysts for all intelligence transactions 
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• Provide incentives that improve intelligence sharing and collaboration and change 
intelligence community focus to “need to share” to meet consumer demands   
• Provide qualitative measures of effectiveness 
• Increase the incentives for competitive analysis and alternative hypothesis 
• Routinize data management & validation from operational and HUMINT sources 
• Increase awareness of organizational and community capabilities and skills 
• Better prioritize intelligence requirements globally, regionally and locally 
• Utilize otherwise unused analysis capabilities (spare capacity) 
• Reach remote specialized skills and analysis 
• Provide a common transaction space for multi – intelligence products  
• Provide a single process for crisis and routine intelligence requirements that has 
reach to the entire intelligence community 
All of these ultimately lead to improvement in the quality of information available 
for the decision making commander.  The bottom line reason to develop the VMIM 
transaction space is that it adds value and can start to change the intelligence community 
today.  To better see how, the remaining portion of this chapter walks through the market 
model.   
Keep in mind that this market model doesn’t change the organizations involved in 
the market either by their organization designs or their current business processes.  
Instead the VMIM provides a transaction space between organizations that is specifically 
focused on stating and answering intelligence requirements of intelligence consumers 
wherever they maybe.  The internal workings of an organization are left to their own 
efficiencies and business processes.  
B. INTELLIGENCE MARKET MACRO VARIABLES  
These are the essential variable required to start to think about the intelligence 
market.  Each market needs to identify these components.  What are the needs, who are 
the consumers and solution providers?  What is exchanged in the virtual market and what 
are the incentives for participation?  Figure 1 represents the top level of the VMIM. 
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Figure 1.   Virtual Military Intelligence Market 
 
1. Buyers/Consumers and Demand 
The consumers in the intelligence process and the VMIM include commanders, 
operational personnel, and military planners.  Depending on their specific task, analysts 
and collection managers may fill the role of consumers as well.  Each of these consumers 
has specific demands for the VMIM-- ranging from intelligence analysis, raw data, 
asset/resource time and current operational situational awareness including: battle 
damage assessment, country studies, target identification, and adhoc field operational 
debriefs to name a few.  The commander’s information requirements about the battlefield 
or adversary largely drive the intelligence market.  
2. Sellers/Solution Providers 
The solution providers include all of the production organizations and asset 
owners involved in U.S. intelligence.  Table 1 summarizes these.  Additional solution 
providers for the VMIM are fielded operational forces and HUMINT networks in forward 
locations.  Each of these sources can provide valuable information and/or analysis for 
stated intelligence requirement.  
47 
 
Table 2. Intelligence Solution Providers (JP 2-01, 2004) 
• Service Intelligence Organizations--Air 
Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps  
• (NGA) National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency 
• (NSA) National Security Agency • (CIA) Central Intelligence Agency 
• (NRO) National Reconnaissance Office • (DOS) Department of State 
• (DIA) Defense Intelligence Agency • (FBI) Federal Bureau of Investigations 
• (DOT) Department of Treasury • (DOE) Department of Energy 
• (NMJIC) National Military Joint 
Intelligence Center 
• Combatant Commander’s (JIC) Joint 
Intelligence Centers 
• Department of Homeland Security (JP 2-01, 2004) 
 
3. Exchanges 
There are a variety of exchanges involved in the intelligence process today, and 
market mechanism can facilitate most of them.  Intelligence requirements are met with 
solutions consisting of either raw data or analyzed products of various types from the 
assets and production organizations mentioned above.  Examples of intelligence include:  
• (SIGINT) signals intelligence 
• (IMINT) imagery intelligence 
• (HUMINT) human intelligence 
• (MASINT) measurement and signature intelligence  
• (OSINT) open-source intelligence 
• (TECHINT) technical intelligence  
• (CI) counterintelligence 
• (MULTINT) multiple intelligence product (JP 2-0, 2000).  
In addition to intelligence products, the VMIM exchanges feedback and 
performance/quality metrics for all products and databases.  The VMIM also records a 
value for the transaction (cost basis or point system), and reflects the preferences of 
consumers for tailored or routine products in requirement templates. 
4. Incentives 
As mentioned in the model development chapter, the use of a cost basis or other 
value basis in the exchange phase of a transaction, may never equate to dollars (or profit) 
for participating organizations.  Today, U.S. legislation restricts exchanges of 
money/budgets between the departments.  However, with changed legislation, a yearly 
exchange of accumulated costs recorded on a market between departments, such as the 
CIA and DOD, would be a powerful indirect incentive for outside organizations to 
participate in the military market.  Today these measures could definitely be used by 
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decision makers at all levels for determining budgets and billets within the DOD.  
Additionally, under today’s laws, this department and agency score card could be used by 
U.S. policymakers to help determine department and agency budgets.  When an 
organization is judged not for the secrets that they hold, but instead by the demand for 
and quality of actionable intelligence they provide warfighters and policymakers, this 
meaningful change in community focus provides ample incentive to participate.   
At the operational level, motivation to get quality information to the decision 
maker hardly needs an incentive; the knowledge that the market presents the transaction 
space to meet almost all intelligence needs may be enough.  The common transaction 
space of the VMIM should provide a user friendly environment for both consumer and 
solution provider.  Other incentives to participate in the VMIM include the record of all 
transactions and a means of providing the intelligence community qualitative feedback 
measures by organization.  Market transactions are recorded down to the analyst level 
and thus also provide individual performance and contribution measures of effectiveness.  
This will prove to be very important for future personnel performance based systems 
being considered by the DOD (Barnett, 2005). 
5. Market Policy and Broker Needs 
Both market policies and brokers are essential for the VMIM.  The policy and 
broker needs that were apparent during use case development are presented as they occur 
in the micro transaction sections that follow.  One important market policy for 
consideration in the intelligence market is a consideration of the “monetary” policy.  This 
thesis hasn’t created a budget for the consumer to be constrained or limited by.  The 
effort is to get as much information to the decision making commander as possible and 
that is wanted.  This policy may have the result of over tasking market assets, since the 
consumer may accept all, some or none of the solutions presented in the market.  
However, since organizations are submitting solution proposals for requirements, the 
market assumes that the solution provider has the ability to produce and is within its 
capacity.  Some artificially high capacities may result from the lack of economic 
constraints on the consumer.  This is an example of a market policy that should be 
experimented with, but caution should be used when considering limitations on 
operational intelligence consumption.  The profile pages should show capacities of the 
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participating market organizations being represented such as the OIF Intelligence Market 
in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.   VMIM Profile Pages 
 
B. INTELLIGENCE MARKET MICRO VARIABLES 
This section develops the transaction space for the VMIM.  These variables are 
specifically designed to capture requirements and present solutions in the most effective 
way possible.  This should be kept in mind during market development. 
1. Statement of Requirement (Demand)  
Here are a few examples of demands that are presented by commanders, analysts, 
collection managers, and operational participants of the VMIM. 
• Priority intelligence requirement 
• Requests for information (RFI) 
• Battle damage assessment 
• Raw data – images, signals, etc 
• Asset tasking 
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The more descriptive and specific the request provided to the VMIM, the better 
the market response can be.  One VMIM market policy may have requirement 
validation/quality validation by brokers when an intelligence officer is not associated 
with the operational unit stating the requirement.  This is an easy requirement quality 
check to be accomplished, for example by a JIC broker, to assure that the requirement is 
properly stated and facilitated.  Example requirement templates can help achieve this. 
Tasking of assets today is a tightly controlled process.  However, as demonstrated 
by the Office of Force Transformation’s Operationally Responsive Space Experiment 
TacSat-1, perhaps direct asset tasking at the Joint Task Force level is not so unimaginable 
(OFT, 2005B).  Today, one such asset is subject to tactical SIPRNET control and 
dissemination of both its infrared and visible imagery.  The market would utilize a similar 
brokered mechanism to reach assets not normally associated with a particular operation. 
A commander’s request for battlespace awareness is a request for a wide range of 
information that, in many cases, operational debriefs can help fulfill.  These types of 
requirements are not typical of commercial markets, but are important in the battlespace.  
By using the idea that every person is a sensor, additional information can be quickly 
added to the common operational and intelligence picture of an operation.  In the past 
such information has flowed through chat sessions.  However, this information can and 
has proved to result in incidents of fratricide because the information wasn’t validated 
against the current intelligence or operational picture. The market should formalize a 
process for getting that data into the market and provide a validation process for it. 
2. Market Templates  
VMIM requirement templates are critical to capturing intelligence needs.  The 
template must capture what the consumer/buyer, the commander, needs from the market 
to get the mission accomplished.  The goal is to get better information to the decision 
maker.  The requirement template is similar to those in current use, but tailored to best 
reflect consumer needs.  Important worksheet features include a space for an operation 
identifier, priority, and time elements.  These tie the requirement to operations, and start 
to establish baseline metric data.  
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Figure 3 is an example online form. This template shows the required fields by 
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Figure 3.   Example VMIM Requirement Template 
 When a consumer fills it out, his organization and contact information are 
automatically filled in, as well as the operation he is involved with and request date.  The 
request date is kept updated until submitted to the market. The consumer fills in the “no 
later than” delivery time, and delivery instructions.  Another network may need to be 
used to actually exchange the data; this is much the same as choosing between FEDEX 
and US Mail for delivery.  Consumers can select to receive automatic or flagged updates. 
The template allows a consumer select a priority for the requirement where 
priority 3 is a normal priority.   Priority 2- high, or priority 1- life or death, require 
validation by the market broker responsible for the market in question and will receive 
preferential treatment and close monitoring by brokers and solution providers.  Reserving 
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this type of activity and preferential treatment to these very critical priorities will assure 
that the market can respond well to the situation where time matters to the operator. 
The requirement template submitted to the market becomes the “in process” 
template that is seen in the market place.  At this point, the template needs to have a 
status section showing any required validations, indicate which organizations are working 
on solutions proposals and/or negotiating (refining) the requirement with the consumer.  
Bottom line the in process requirement should have as much information about efforts to 
solve the requirement as possible.   
Solution providers fill in their solution information on a proposal template.  The 
proposal should capture (or link to) all previous information about the requirement.  The 
consumer of the intelligence market may select all, some, or none of the solutions 
presented by the market by selecting “accept” on the solution template they receive.  This 
then goes back to the solution organization(s) and they start working from the solution 
template.  The solution template should record all sources and additional transactions 
completed by the organization to accomplish the requirement.  Eventually this solution 
template and final product are sent back to the requestor.  As a market policy, the 
visibility of the solution template should probably remain hidden (to those outside the 
tasked solution organization) until the organization has approved its release.  The “in 
process” requirement template could show a progress indicator (by organization if 
multiple organization’s are responding) that can be seen by the consumer and market.  
Subscription type information requirement templates can be used to enable pull 
access to databases and pushed intelligence products.  The organic databases in the 
VMIM would have a yearly subscription rate access to the databases.  In the case of a 
routine product distribution (such as a daily brief) that is not posted to a database, the 
consumer fills out a requirement template for a particular report and or topic to 
automatically receive updates or routine product distribution from an organization.  The 
organizations that have these products should list them in their profile page, and offer a 
subscription link for them.   
Another important template that should be developed is a field data and 
operations debrief template to facilitate the exchange of our own field operator 
53 
HUMINT.  This information would go, among other places, into one of the VMIM’s 
organic HUMINT databases – a field data repository.  An operations debrief template is 
developed that offers a selection of formats from a pull down menu (for example aircrew 
or operational unit post mission HUMINT report).  This information would be filled in by 
a debriefer or operations personnel, and depending on market rules, the information 
would be routed to brokers for validation and release to the field debrief database for 
better battlefield situational awareness.  The operator & broker may flag the priority of 
the information to show up in “hot” topics for the operational and intelligence markets. 
The VMIM can offer a variety of means to negotiate or further define 
requirements, and monitor solution progress.  This can be done in a workspace associated 
with the requirement template or by phone calls, chat rooms, etc.  What is important is 
that the history of requirement negotiation is recorded in the template to reflect 
requirement refinement and changes. 
3. Cost Basis or Value Determination 
Every intelligence product or database access should have a published or derived 
cost for its use.  For most products, this should include the raw data costs and analyst 
time costs.  For example, access to databases (pull capability) can be given for a yearly 
subscription or a sub-time frame like a quarterly or monthly cost.  Database subscriptions 
are calculated by totaling the yearly cost of the database (system, estimated analyst time, 
and raw data costs) and then dividing by a certain number of expected subscriptions as 
illustrated in Figure 4.  This will essentially “recover” the database cost basis over a 
timeframe and provide a market value of database information and analysis. 
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Database Annual Cost
• Number of items in the database
• Collection cost estimate--asset costs assessed 
from original source (one or many assets)
• Human analysis conducted? % of DB items
– By analysis type (1-4)
– Add analysis cost to that % of items
• Add publisher & database admin cost per year*
• Determine # subscriptions expected to cover 
costs to determine price 
* Publisher or database administrators other than analysts
 
Figure 4.   Example of Database Cost Basis Determination 
Raw data costs are derived from either a portion of a subscription rate to a large 
database, or the published cost of a specifically tasked asset.  In the case of a satellite 
specifically tasked to provide images to meet an intelligence requirement, that asset will 
have an advertised per image cost, as established in DOD cost basis tables. 
Analyst time can be calculated as an average.  In the course of this research, 
intelligence analysts suggested that capturing analyst time used in less than one-hour 
increments would not be a useful record in the design of the VMIM.  This probably needs 
further discussion.  However, setting up a scale of analysis-- an example of which is 
shown in Figure 5, can capture enough detail to establish initial VMIM value.  The 
VMIM is not looking to capture exact detail of the hours and cost of every analyst from 
junior grade to the most senior grade that were involved in the production and approval 
of a product within an organization.  Instead, establishing a representative scale of the 
order of magnitude of effort that the organization expects to use in their solution may be 
more useful.  With this method, an organization presents an analyst solution to a RFI with 
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Figure 5.   Example of Analyst Cost Basis Determination by Scale 
In initial market development, for simplicity, the hourly cost of analysis could be 
the average analyst cost from junior to senior grade.  This average analyst cost should be 
determined by the market, not the organization.  This type of intelligence market cost can 
be determined in a couple of ways.  One method is to look to the commercial market for 
an equivalent cost; another is to simply take an average military salary hourly cost.  This 
variable can be refined and reflect more detail of the cost difference between analysts 
(civilian, military, junior and senior grades); however establishing one average cost is 
recommended for initial market development. The idea is to begin to reflect the cost basis 
of intelligence for post operation analysis.  Exact calculation isn’t necessary and careful 
consideration of just “how many clicks” to state/answer requirements needs to keep this 
market easy to use.   
Daily or routine analysis products that are pushed to multiple consumers and/or 
posted to a database will also have a published cost.  Again this cost is based on the 
average analyst time used and an average of the raw data typically used in the product.  
For an organization to determine such a price, they could track (for a period of time) how 
many analyst hours are used, and how many other resources are used (raw data, tasked 
assets, etc) to create a typical product offering such as the commander’s daily brief.  
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Once this study is completed, the products average cost is derived and published as the 
cost basis.  Quarterly or annual reviews of daily products should be accomplished to 
update this cost basis.  This is a type of market policy that will help to best reflect the 
value of items being exchanged on the market. 
Certain demand conditions or capacity values for assets and analysis should 
increase the published cost basis (or point value) of the asset and or product.  This is 
another example of a market policy rule.  When an asset, resource, or organization has 
reached a certain capacity, prices should increase for that asset.  The price could increase 
by some percentage (for example 20%) as a certain demand count or capacity is reached, 
or when maximum capacity is reached the cost basis could simply double.  These are 
examples of ways to achieve market-like conditions and provide useful operational 
indicators.  In this way a record of reaching this capacity or demand is recorded and 
prices change much as they would in commercial markets.   
  In some cases there are alternatives for attaining similar intelligence from assets 
that are not over capacity, markets now can provide indicators for consumers and brokers 
to take advantage of alternative available to them. This is useful for any number of assets 
and organizations such as over-tasked aircraft, satellite, or production organization.  In 
post operation market analysis, these transaction records help provide useful information 
about resource shortages. 
In a similar fashion another market rule is used for priority that changes the cost 
basis.  When assets are being tasked, queuing rules apply.  In commercial markets first to 
arrive is usually first served.  For most of the transactions in the intelligence market this 
will be true as well.  However, when higher priority short time frame requirements come 
in, they need to be treated differently in the military intelligence market.  Some “jumping 
ahead” in the queue may be needed.  In such a case, the market way to handle this is to 
charge a “penalty” to the late requirement that needs to get in front of others.  Here again 
the emphasis on changing the cost basis or point system is to record the transaction 
differently than others.  In the operational environment, these may happen quite often in a 
changing battlespace.  In much the same way as capacity and demand, it is important to 
record the impact of priority transactions on the market.  Where a high priority 
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requirement comes in, but queuing rules are not violated, then the transaction cost 
remains at the current market value.    
4. Performance Ratings 
How well an intelligence asset, analyst, or organization is doing in a market is 
represented by the demand for the product or asset and measured by the feedback and 
quality metrics assessed by consumers.  How will the military market determine a 
performance rating for intelligence resources, assets, and organizations?  Joint 
Publication 2.0 offers the following attributes of the quality of intelligence: 
• Anticipatory of commander needs for current and potential operational 
missions and involved in their planning at the earliest time possible. 
• Timely- intelligence must be available when required. 
• Accurate- intelligence must be factual, estimate future adversary 
courses of action with sound judgment and describe what is known of 
the situation 
• Usable- intelligence must be tailored to commander’s needs, fitting the 
context of its use, and use language known to the consumer. 
• Complete- intelligence must reflect the fullest degree of knowledge of 
an adversary’s capabilities, potential courses of action, and intentions. 
• Relevant- intelligence must be related to the current operation and not 
trivial, and kept up to date with situation changes. 
• Objective- intelligence must be unbiased, undistorted, and free from 
political constraints, because it is often used to derive policy.   
• Available- includes timeliness, usability, at the lowest classification 
level possible (2000).  
Some combination of these performance measures should be captured by the 
market.  Consumer feedback and transaction timestamps can provide measures of 
timeliness.  A measure for accuracy and completeness, usability and relevance should be 
included in consumer feedback.  A feedback metric for objectiveness may include a 
measure of alternative hypothesis and analysis considered by analysis.  Like the Elance 
market, a perfect score for an intelligence product would be a five, but shortfalls in any of 
these measures will degrade the score.  Feedback from the consumer will be required for 
all routine or planning intelligence, and routinely for database use as well.  As presented 
earlier, these measures are intended to provide the decision maker quality indicators and 
estimates of the information he is getting.  Therefore the measures used in the 
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intelligence market should be focused on these objectives, and be developed with scale 
and meaning used by the entire intelligence market.   
Requirements should not close until feedback is provided, perhaps with its own 
incentive system (higher value basis given for faster feedback).  Some consideration may 
need to be given to feedback completion during crises; however feedback is essential, and 
should be completed as soon a possible.  A separate set of long term accuracy 
performance metrics may be considered for the intelligence market that update metrics as 
more information becomes available. 
Performance based on pure quantities of raw data and analysis made available or 
provided to the intelligence market is not that meaningful.  Another example of a more 
useful indicator of quality/performance may be shown by the consumer demand for a 
certain product, organization, or asset.  As mentioned previously, demand should be a 
calculated for databases of raw data or analysis, assets, and organizations.  The demand 
recorded in transactions combined with qualitative performance metrics and feedback are 
very powerful indicators of performance. 
5. Time 
Time requirements for intelligence range from planning requirements to just-in-
time targeting information.  In all cases it is the consumer’s responsibility to state the 
time in which the intelligence is needed.  Two time requirements are needed in the 
VMIM: time to present proposal (bids) and time to present solution.  Meeting these 
timeframe is then the responsibility of solution providers, and may require the attention 
of brokers, depending on priority.  Meeting requirement time is a suggested metrics for 
performance and feedback.   
Some market policies may be employed for time sensitive requirements.  As 
discussed in the cost factors section, in commercial markets queuing rules are usually by 
first come first served.  This is fine for normal operations, but not during operations and 
crises situations.  In these situations, a priority 1 or 2 requirement may have to jump 
ahead in queue.  Broker roles are also suggested for monitoring market transactions to 
help timeliness; brokers can keep an eye on higher priority time sensitive requirements 
and make sure they are acted upon quickly by solution providers.   
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6. Brokers 
Brokers are important in the intelligence market.  In some cases information 
exchanges are automatic; this is the case of subscriptions for pull databases or push 
products.  In other cases, such as an intelligence requirement coming out of the field, 
brokers with situational awareness may need to translate field information requirements 
into an intelligence requirement for the market.  The best use of brokers in the VMIM is 
to utilize broker subject matter (or area) expertise and place the broker with a perspective 
of the entire market.  In this case the broker can help facilitate the needs of the entire 
market, and get more requirements fulfilled throughout the market.   However, for the 
operational market user, broker roles are tasked more specifically to facilitate solutions 
for that operational consumer.  In this situation the broker would reach out to solution 
providers with requirements on behalf of the operational troops.  Hence the power of 
markets-- they can be developed very specifically or very generally, depending on 
consumer and/or solution providers needs while utilizing the same transaction space.   
Brokers are highly skilled members of the Combatant Commander’s JICs, JTFs, 
J2 shops, or direct unit support intelligence officers.  Brokers may also be needed at the 
national level production centers to determine their agency availability and serve as 
“gatekeepers” for their organizations.  If a requirement is routed to a national agency by a 
consumer without prior relationship to that organization, agency brokers can determine 
release and/or route of the requirement into the agency, or provide a negative response.   
Collection managers are essential brokers for tasking assets.  By monitoring 
capacities available to the market, these brokers can help facilitate as many collection 
requirements as possible, much as they do today.  Working within the VMIM, collection 
managers and other highly placed brokers may better recognize the shortage of assets or 
resources that can not be resolved within the marketplace.  In this case the broker may 
inform the Combatant Commanders, who in turn invite other asset/organization 
participation not normally associated with the market.   
Brokers at the JIC or unit level may need to validate new information coming out 
of the field, quickly.  These debrief or sources of HUMINT information are critical to 
current operational situational awareness.  These validations allow the information to 
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become part of the operational and intelligence picture with the least amount of risk to 
friendly forces, and help avoid incidents of fratricide.  
 Requirements that necessitate broker attention will show up by priority in broker 
queues.  Broker identification numbers are recorded on the requirement/solution 
transaction when a broker role has been fulfilled.  Some of the roles suggested so far 
include:  Recommending solution providers, tasking an asset, validating a requirement or 
its priority, or validating information for release to a database.  The value added to the 
intelligence process by these roles may be determined in market refinement.  
7. Market Participation and Location 
The intelligence market should exist on the SIPRNET as part of the overall 
military market.  It should reflect all of the transactions between intelligence 
organizations, assets, databases and analysts.  However, based on classification, the 
exchange of intelligence may be handled on other networks based on classification.  The 
goal of this intelligence market is to get more intelligence at the collateral level, where 
information exchanges at higher levels are the exception and not the rule. 
The market as a whole would be open to all participants.  However, the view of 
each organization and participant would be limited to needed visibility, need to know, 
and/or invitation to participate.  For example, normally the Pacific Command JIC would 
not see the details of the Central Command market.  However, if they have been invited 
to provide capabilities, those invited entities would have access to those parts of the 
market not normally associated with their area of responsibility.  Figure 6 shows a view 
of the Operation Iraqi Freedom Intelligence Market. 
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Figure 6.   View of the VMIM OIF Market 
The intelligence market appears a number of ways within the VMM.  Intelligence 
would be listed as its own separate market at the highest level of the military market, but 
parts of it would appear beneath the operational market representing a Joint Task Force, 
area of responsibility, or national priority such as the Global War on Terrorism. 
8. Unit Profiles 
The organization or agency’s VMIM profile pages lists the products, assets, and 
intelligence types that an organization has available for a particular market.  This is an 
important record of capabilities present on the market.  Portfolio pages would give 
commanders and analysts the ability to browse for specific reports, capabilities, or 
options.  This profile page would reflect the categories of intelligence that auto sensors 
would utilize to convey notification of new requirements presented to the market that the 
organization can meet.  Consumers may also query the market for certain capabilities, the 
list returned would be based on the information in the profile page. 
The profile page should also have an indication of an organizations approved 
operational markets.  The case may be that certain regional organizations have not been 
approved to provide solutions to markets in other areas of responsibility.  If this is the 
case, their reach would be limited to command-approved areas of responsibility only.  
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The portfolio would reflect that on the registration page, and the unit probably would not 
have visibility to the other parts of the market, except perhaps at the broker levels.  If the 
restrictions are lifted, and command has authorized support, the approved areas of 
responsibilities are then indicated on the portfolio page. 
The profile page has the published prices of routine products, raw data, etc.  
These prices only change as a factor of demand reaching capacity and priority rules.  
Current capacity should be listed on the portfolio, especially for assets such as aircraft or 
satellites.  The profile page has a record of feedback and performance metrics as well.  
Figure 7 provides an example profile.   
 
National Geo-Spatial Intelligence 
Agency (NGA) www.nga.smil.mil
Home VMM   News BUYERS      SELLERS RESOURCES
V-MIM
OIF Organizational Profile
Avg Capacity =  75%
NGA provides imag ery, imag ery intell igence, and geosp atial d ata and information in support of national securit y.
Products: Newsletter
Databases Taskable Asset Satellites
GEOnet Names Server (GNS) IKONOS 99%
Digital Point Positioning Database (DPPDB) Radarsat 65%
Digital Nautical Chart Databases (DNC®)
Analysis Products  Analyst Capacity 70%
Pan sharpened imagery 3D Views - TIR
MSI Target Identification Geospatial Intelligence Fusion
SAR Target Identification TIR Target Identification
D&D Verification Material Analysis
3D Views – MSI Terrain Categorization
3D Views – SAR
Contact:   Ed Bickford
egbickf ord@nga.smil
Feedback Summary
Feedback Reviews:  10
Earnings:  $3,288
Avg Rating:  4.5
View All Feedback
Go To VMM Go To V-MIM
VMM ID:  N-007
Supported Operations 
 
Figure 7.   Example Profile Page 
 
9. Resource and Unit Availability 
The resources for any particular intelligence market are those assigned or invited 
assets or organizations within the combatant commander’s area of responsibility.  In open 
commercial markets, the consumer (or broker) is not particularly concerned about an 
organization’s capacity.  However, in these smaller finite resource military markets, 
capacity is something to be concerned about, and should be represented at both the 
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organizational and market levels.  Thus every organizations/asset’s capacity should be 
presented on the organizations profile page.   
This capacity indicator represents the amount of analysis, raw data, or 
subscriptions available to a particular market.  This number is a reflection of an asset’s or 
resources “taskability”.  For example, how many pictures can the asset provide the 
market?  In the case of analyst capacity this is a far more subjective variable.  Coming up 
with analyst capacity per day (week, month, or year) available to a particular market may 
be a difficult task.  The analysts are involved with more than specific task analysis.  In 
many cases, the bulk of time spent by analysts is not in product creation, but instead is 
spent reviewing current information and adding to “knowledge libraries” accessible in 
databases.   
One way to state available capacity to the intelligence market is for the 
intelligence organization to provide an estimation of actual “taskable production” time.  
For every organization, this will be a different estimate depending on the type of 
intelligence, number of personnel, their internal process for creating products, etc.  This 
available capacity may change daily, weekly, or monthly depending on personnel/asset 
availability and down time.  The market needs an available capacity for any given time 
for an organization for a current capacity measure to be reasonably assessed.  Caution 
should be used by organizations, and enforced by brokers that the capacity used and 
available stay reflective and close to the organization’s true capacity.  Market rules may 
be in place for organizations not to accept tasks beyond their capacity.  In this way the 
market can account for this by shifting demand to other organizations.  Another example 
of a market policy fix may be to increase an organization’s capacity to more reflect an 
organization’s current production rate if the unit is consistently engaged in 
“overproduction” (which creates a higher product cost for that organization, based on the 
value basis rule used) if “overproduction” is sustained.   
This is an example of a variable that is refined over time in the market.  Units will 
get smarter about their capacity.  For example, if an organization presents 100 hours (per 
week) of analysis time available and then responds to requirements for that amount of 
time (uses all of their capacity), that organization is now better equipped to judge its 
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capacity based on completing the requirements.  If the organization is able to complete 
the requirements on time, then 100 hours is an accurate (or under) estimation of capacity 
by that unit’s leadership.  However, if a pattern of late production occurs, barring other 
issues, then the estimate of 100 hours of analyst capacity may be too high.  This estimate 
of “taskable production” time capacity provides the limit of cost basis that the unit may 
recover from the market, and may motivate high estimates.  This variable needs to be 
carefully developed and tested in market experimentation. 
10. Special Considerations 
Special consideration may be needed for long term intelligence activities.  
Resources and analysts that support national level long term intelligence may have few 
demands that result in transactions.  Because of this these resources may appear 
underutilized and unproductive.  Both incentives and cost basis need to be determined for 
long term intelligence requirements.  Otherwise, organizations would not have incentives 
to continue to work long term intelligence.  One suggestion is to assign general national 
security requirement identifiers to be collected against.  In this way the market can 
capture the value of all of this type of activity.  Another option is to t consider these 
activities as market exceptions.  Other very niche capabilities may have similar issues. 
Based on the “who or what” of certain solution providers, assets, and consumers.  
Some requirements, solutions, etc may be visible by invitation only.  These transactions 
can also be recorded by the market, and approved for visibility by organization or down 
to the user level if required.  This thesis recommends that all possible effort should be 
made to make all intelligence as widely available as possible; however by the nature of 
the operation, in some cases that just can not happen.  However, a market with a good 
cryptography protocol can facilitate these needs. 
C. ESTIMATES OF IMPROVED DECISION MAKING 
1. Current Capabilities 
Some of the capabilities presented here exist today in the Community On-Line 
Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM) automated production 
and requirements management system.  COLISEUM improves the process for priority 
requirements by automating registration, validation, and production assignment and 
allowing deconflicted on-line scheduling of intelligence products.  It provides an 
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automated method of tracking and monitoring production requirements and scheduling, 
and provides graphical reporting and offers a quantitative metrics basis for performance 
standards.  COLISEUM increased efficient data retrieval for analysts and provided access 
through IntelLink to intelligence products (Pike, 2002).  
Intelligence analysts suggest that the metrics provided by COLISEUM are being 
used as the source of unit level performance metrics.  This database is installed at all 
Combatant Commands, DOD production centers, DIA, CIA, NSA, Joint Intelligence 
Centers, and Service equivalents.  COLISEUM also provides the products created in a 
common searchable (by subject only) database.   
COLISEUM offers many useful features, many of which would be replicated in 
the VMIM.  So, what is missing?  COLISEUM transactions take place primarily on the 
Top Secret network and are out of reach for many operational units.  COLISEUM doesn’t 
record a value basis, or record of resources with the transactions and records only some 
of the transactions present in the Intelligence Community today, primarily IMINT.  Pure 
quantity of production is not a good measure of success; markets offer ongoing 
qualitative metrics, updates and long term metrics may be kept about the accuracy of 
intelligence.  Demand should be recorded for all units, assets, and types of products 
available in the market.  COLISEUM doesn’t yet handle all types of intelligence and isn’t 
a one stop shop for operator, commander, or analyst.  COLISEUM doesn’t capture the 
profiles or capacity of its organizations available to the market. 
The intelligence production business process presented in the COLISEUM 
Handbook (Shook, 2004) is changed when using a market model.  The market process 
involves stating a requirement and having solutions presented much like the business 
process in COLISEUM.  However, the market does not mandate chain of command 
validation of requirement/solution or assignment (tasking) to a production center.  
Requirement validation may be required by an organization, but not dictated by market 
process.  In a market model, the production centers determine their ability to answer a 
request for information or production requirement, rather than having them tasked to 
them. 
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The market model provides a value basis missing in COLISEUM.  It facilitates 
the exchange of all intelligence regardless of its source or classification. The market 
records and encourages transactions at a lower classification to better facilitate the needs 
of operators.  The VMIM uses market mechanics and incentives that focus the utilization 
of resources and analysis capabilities to meet requirements by having solution providers 
estimate their ability to answer requirements on time, rather than managers tasking what 
are thought to be best solutions.  VMIM brokers make it their business to answer as many 
intelligence requirements as possible, and assure that priority and time sensitive 
requirements are met.  Where many requirements disappear into the cyberspace of 
COLISEUM today, consumers of the VMIM will know who is or is not working the 
requirement, and if solutions are available by the record on the requirement and/or 
solution template.  Profile pages for each organization participating in the market offer a 
glimpse to all of a production organizations assets, products, and analysis capability 
giving the operator a better idea of available resources.  Bottom line, the VMIM offers a 
transaction space focused on meeting demands with incentives to do it. 
2. Market Mechanisms Work Together 
As suggested in the market model, the VMIM mechanics and transaction space 
collectively provide better information to the decision-making commander.  This happens 
in part by presenting clear statements of information needs with templates that capture 
the intelligence requirement as well as through negotiations between operations and 
intelligence to better refine those requirements.  Other examples of the cycle of improved 
information are offered in Appendix A.   
The quality of intelligence can be measured with the right combination of 
historical feedback, performance measures, and transaction records.  For example, how 
many sources were used to reach the conclusion presented in the hypothesis?  Were 
alternative hypothesis considered and/or asked for in the requirement?  Intelligence 
performance and feedback may change as time reveals the accuracy of a hypothesis.  
Hindsight is usually 20/20, so feedback and performance measures on some intelligence 
may require updates to provide the best historical record of accuracy possible.  This kind 
of reevaluation of intelligence is tough medicine; however the market transaction space 
can support this evaluation of historical evidence better than the potpourri of system 
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feedbacks available today.  The result is better information from all sources available to 
the decision making commander.   
3. Post Operational Transaction Analysis 
Once employed in the operational world, the VMIM has a record of all 
transactions.  This gives senior DOD leadership an appreciation for the contributions of 
organizations, analysts, or assets for any particular operation, period of time, or area of 
responsibility.  The market has a record of all unmet requirements, either because they 
just could not be answered with current capabilities or because of resource scarcity. 
As the DOD steadily moves toward EBO an increased number of intelligence 
requirements from the operations side will query for EBO battle damage assessments.  
Intelligence may have difficulty in assessing the more cognitive side of the operational 
effects.  As these difficulties are recorded by the market in requirement definitions, 
negotiations, and with feedback and performance measurement they will show the need 
for new capabilities.  The requirement will have to be restated and provide the closest 
assessment possible.  Enough such shortfalls and compromises should provide the 
community an indicator for the need to develop new capabilities and or methods to meet 
those requirements. 
Other post analysis and error checking analysis can be developed for the VMIM.  
Tendencies can be shown.  If a number of consumers are all getting in the same queue for 
their intelligence products, which is fine if that agency is producing accurate analysis, not 
so good if it is not.   Transactions that record changes and error can be retraced to provide 
corrections.  In this way the market may better facilitate new commander’s estimates.  
Professor John Arquilla maintains that market analysis and error checking may provide 
measures of improved intelligence not yet conceived (2005).  
4. Objections to Intelligence Market 
Mark Lowenthal presents some difficulties for intelligence markets in his 
Intelligence Reform chapter.  One objection presented is how to determine “fair costs” for 
any one intelligence product.  Another is how to account for less pressing or long term 
intelligence (Lowenthal, 2003).  Lowenthal does suggest that having an understanding of 
the “true costs of intelligence” will help policy makers make more informed decisions, 
and that for high priority issues markets may be more effective and competitive. 
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Long term intelligence was discussed in the special considerations section above.  
Lowenthal’s first objection is handled by the VMIM by recording all of the transaction 
required by the analyst(s) to answer a requirement.  The requirement number is tagged on 
all of those transactions completed in the market on behalf of that requirement, including 
those that were actually exchanged on another network.  In this way the cost basis of all 
assets, resources, and analysis is captured by the solution template during the market 
process.  This is somewhat like having a reference page to the requirement, a record of 
sources and resource costs side of the product.   
The after action value of recording such transactions are numerous.  Consider just 
the knowledge management side of this transaction record that provides a useful “off the 
shelf” solution for analyzing a type of requirement.  The analysis approach can be 
studied, learned from, passed on, improved upon, etc.  Young analysts can take a look at 
their predecessors’ methods for analysis, just by looking at the market’s solution page of 
a completed requirement.  Such metrics are very useful to intelligence leadership.  The 
other contribution to determining “fair costs” is the number of analyst hours used to 
answer the requirement.  How to record analyst time is talked about in the cost basis 
section.  The market captures analyst time used to create standard and tailored products.  
These particular objections are addressed by this market model.  Other objections 
claim that intelligence is “too bureaucratic” or that the problem is “too large” and suggest 
that markets can not work because of these.  Markets have been used throughout history 
to match needs with solutions at all scales-- large or small, long term and short term.  
Global markets exist today, and the virtual spaces that make these possible are suited to 
the needs of intelligence solutions.  If the improvements presented in the introduction of 
this chapter are met, most of these types of objections are simply noise. 
Discussions with intelligence professionals about the intelligence market had a lot 
of questions about internal organizational processes.  Such as:  “who presents proposals 
or final solutions to the market from my organization?”  The short answer to questions 
like this is: Markets do not dictate internal organizational processes or decision making.  
Military markets shouldn’t dictate these policies any more than commercial markets tell 
business how to produce and coordinate their products.  These processes and policies are 
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up to the organization.  However, it is quite possible that organizations that do not push 
product approval down to the lowest necessary level, they will under-perform 
organizations that have in the market space.  Clearly these decisions are product and 
circumstance specific and should be treated as such by participating organizations.  
D. INTELLIGENCE MARKET CONCLUSION 
DOD is starting to realize the value of the market environment without precisely 
naming the solution a “market”.  General Cartwright, Commander US Strategic 
Command-- DOD’s lead for worldwide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR)-- presents the following prescription: 
A collaborative environment, dedicated to space and global strike, missile 
defense, information operations, and global ISR—that will enable users to 
enter into this environment and draw upon the products and skill of all the 
[component commands], irrespective of where the user has entered the 
environment (2005). 
This recommendation sounds very like the VMIM just presented.  General 
Cartwright wants consumer tailored information at the right time and place and he 
recognizes that the technology to achieve this is available (Grossman, 2005).  
The Marine Corp’s development of a tactical fusion center is a well thought out 
idea.  It places the right emphasis on the forward operator while accommodating the 
needs of higher headquarters.   It focuses resources to the guy on the ground (Groen, 
2005).  In much the same way, by accessing a virtual intelligence market, an operator can 
get the response of a world-wide market, and at the same time establish new adhoc 
working relationships that are focused specifically on his needs.  The market is suited to 
the scale of large and small scale operations as well as short and long term needs.  This is 
not reach back or forward—it is “universal reach”. 
These are two examples of direct correlations to the activities of DOD intelligence 
today that fit this market model. The intelligence model is summarized next; these are the 
considerations that make that fit happen. 
1.  Summary 
Here is a summary of the consumers, solution providers, exchanges, incentive, 
brokers and market policies that are part of the VMIM. 
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• Consumers:  Commanders; Planners; Analysts; Field operators; Policy makers 
• Solution Providers: Theatre analysts; Theatre resources and assets; National 
organization/agency analysts; National resources and assets; Operational 
forces and HUMINT networks 
• Summary of what is exchanged in the VMIM: Requirements captured in 
templates; Solution proposals captured in templates; All intelligence type 
products: raw data or analysis; Feedback and performance ratings; A value 
basis either by cost basis or market points 
• Summary of incentives:  Exchange of cost basis and record of all 
transactions– indirect incentives that show the accumulated contribution of 
organizations and personnel; Feedback and performance measures down to 
the analyst level that help focus intelligence organizations on meeting 
intelligence requirements 
• Summary of Brokers:  Collection Managers – task assets and resources; JIC 
level broker – priority, time sensitive, monitor overall market traffic; 
Operational broker – monitor assigned ops, validate/release field data to 
database, flag priority of this information for market; Production agency 
brokers/gatekeepers: (DIA, CIA, FBI, NGA. NSA, DOS, DOT) 
• Summary of Market Policies:  Requirement validation and/or quality check; 
Priority level 1 or 2 validation; No consumer budgets; Changed cost basis for 
moving ahead of other requirements and reaching capacity; Policies on 
feedback; Time policies for priority requirements; Visibility of certain assets, 
units, requirements, and solutions—also by requirement status and by market 
participation/invitation; Using scale of effort and average costs to capture 
analyst and asset costs  
 2.   Conclusion 
Many discussions about the need for intelligence reform air similar grievances.  
Intelligence and military professionals agree that improved measures of success and 
intelligence effects are needed; that the bureaucracy of the intelligence community 
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presents its own obstacles for attaining accurate intelligence estimates or process agility.  
The military is especially dissatisfied with over-classification, stovepipe systems, and the 
difference between recommendations being made at different levels of classification.  
Another common grievance is the lack of trust between organizations in the intelligence 
community as a whole.  Intelligence professionals are also frustrated with the over-
valuation of technology to fix issues without measurable proof of effect and too few 
investments into people compared to that technology.  Operational decentralization has 
not been accomplished in the community.  These are just some of the concerns about 
intelligence community’s effectiveness and structure. 
The demand driven operational VMIM can provide the incentives and 
performance indicators as well as the collaborative but competitive environment to 
change many of these cultural issues.  The VMIM should coexist within an operations 
based market to provide an all source intelligence market in a common transaction space.  
The VMIM provides incentives for participation, a collaborative environment, 
encourages various organizations to present their piece of the picture and get rid of 
stovepipes.  The market creates an environment of competitive analysis and encourages 
the presentation of alternative hypothesis. Markets brokers develop quality social 
network skills.  Such skills will refine the leadership skills of intelligence professionals 
and provide exceptional talents for key senior intelligence leadership positions.   
Markets provide effects based performance indicators from the individual analyst 
to community assets.  All transactions are on one market space, and recorded.  Markets 
effectively decentralized operational command and control of intelligence assets and 
distribution; they simplify the processes and management of crises and non-crises 
intelligence requirements.  Markets represent an entirely new cultural approach to 
intelligence and establish need to share incentives.  Markets can also formalize the receipt 
of field data into intelligence cycle and just as importantly provide a space for 
collaboration among experts.  Market can also facilitate the swarming of intelligence 
talent against high priority national security issues when they arise can be accomplished 
by market forces.  The technical solution to accomplish this is not difficult, but the 
concepts behind this type of transaction activity in the intelligence community have the 
power to change the entire community. 
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The VMIM provides the opportunity for new requirements and products to be 
answered by the intelligence community.  One example of this is the need for an 
information operations assessment of the battlefield during planning.  In the current 
intelligence community, the responsibility for this type of analysis is uncertain.  Such 
assessments need to consider how communication and social networks, global media, 
telecommunications, satellite availability, etc. impact operations in the information and 
cognitive battlefield space.  Actually, many organizations have key contributions for this 
assessment, including operational personnel.  The market creates the opportunity to 
answer this by first presenting the commander’s requirement.  At this point, organizations 
and market brokers determine what organization can best summarize and analyze this 
requirement based on available market resources.  Subsequent requirements can then be 
sent to the market on behalf of the original requirement for specialty information 
exchanges from SIGINT, TECHINT, HUMINT, Civil Affairs, OSINT, sources among 
others to make this assessment complete.  The key point is that markets can produce 
solutions where they didn’t exist before; it allows for the effective creation of working 
relationships and solutions to meet new challenges. 
These are just a few ways that markets have the potential to make positive 
changes for the intelligence community, further study may prove others.  As Professor 
John Arquilla suggests, it may be argued that “an order of magnitude” improvement may 
be achieved by market mechanisms for the intelligence community.  This thesis will 
leave that conclusion for market development and experimentation for proof of concept, 
and the validation of this model. 
This use case is not intended to be developed as is.  The process to apply this 
market model to any specific market should involve an extensive review of requirements 
to be worked on the market, and interviews with all participants from consumer to 
solution providers to best capture the requirements and facilitate the transactions.  This 
use case presents examples of the considerations needed to develop an intelligence 
market; its real world implementation would involve extensive research, combatant 
commander inputs, and intelligence community agreements. 
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V. THESIS CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the objections stated during this thesis research; suggests 
further research for this model, and presents key take aways for the reader.  
A. OBJECTIONS TO MARKET MODEL 
Here are the principle objection themes that were presented during the research of 
this thesis.  Most of these can either be overcome through consideration during market 
development by the use of market policies or with the oversight of brokers.    
1. Military is too Bureaucratic for Markets 
The idea of this model often gets a strong contrary response from conventional 
military thinkers.  Objectors generally say the military is too bureaucratic for market 
mechanisms, and that too many lanes are crossed.  Using markets to provide better 
information to the decision making commander can potentially step all over traditional 
“rice-bowls”.  This is certainly one reason why alternative C4 structures are being 
considered: Focus on mission effectiveness versus traditional ingrained solution sets.  It 
is true that market solutions often bypass several layers of bureaucracy; however they 
have not changed the ultimate authority for decision making or removed any layers of 
support the decision maker may require.  In other words, if the bureaucracy is still 
needed, this model does nothing but provide indicators of organizational effectiveness.   
The model is about solving problems with the minds of the many versus the few and if 
this model proves more effective, based on tangible measurements during validation, then 
it is time to move on.  
2. Information Validation 
Air Force Colonel Daniel Scott the Assistant Commandant at the Defense 
Language Institute Foreign Language Center, reminded this thesis writer that pure ad-hoc 
information sharing in chat sessions can often lead to fratricide; and that these types of 
mistakes are costly in American and coalition lives and very embarrassing to the U.S.  As 
suggested in the VMIM use case, this market should be built with validation mechanisms 
for field data that will help routinize/prioritize the intake of field data.  That data should 
be made available in one of the market’s organic databases, in a similar manner to other 
completed transactions--providing all participants with validated situational awareness.  
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3. Values Difficult to Establish 
Others criticize the attempt to place a “value” on DOD resources, claiming that 
other attempts to capture values have proven futile.  No doubt that an attempt to represent 
all resources in this bureaucracy is nearly impossible.  However, luckily the DOD doesn’t 
have to account for each resource’s profit or present an accurate bottom line that the 
commercial world must; and that’s not the purpose of the value basis in military markets.  
The point is to provide a record of the resources used in a particular transaction, which 
can be defined as narrowly as desired, as long as the same standard is used throughout the 
market.  As a matter of fact, as long as the resources are identified with the solution, and 
part of the transaction, a point or cost value isn’t necessary at all.  The accountants (and 
the General Accounting Office) can take the aggregate and provide a real dollar value 
during post analysis, if necessary.  With a transaction record of resources only, 
commanders still have a better picture when using markets than not.  As mentioned 
throughout this thesis, cost basis probably doesn’t impact decision making until a vast 
cost disparity is the only discriminator between solution sets.  There are not “spending 
limits” to effective operations.  Bottom line: Value precision isn’t the goal, representation 
of asset and organization contribution to the battlespace is.   
4. Military is Overly Competitive  
‘What happens if no one bids?’  During the development of this thesis numerous 
questions were presented about whether solutions would be presented to market 
requirements.    Quite frankly it would be difficult to imagine DOD forces not coming up 
with solution sets and taking actions.  Sean Naylor, Army Times reporter and author of 
Not a Good Day to Die-- about Operation ANACONDA, suggested that in his estimation 
the military is far too competitive to operate under market principles.  His argument is 
probably closer to the reality rather than those predict military “under-bidding.”  To 
answer this, first, the decision making commander is not out of the picture, he still 
decides on who goes.  Second, market policies, such as not allowing bidding from 
solution providers over their “capacity” and/or broker roles come into play.  
5. Objections to Adam Smith’s Free Markets  
The final counter argument theme is probably the most valid.  This idea is that 
using markets for military C4 may not always produce the best solutions for the 
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collective military effort.  This has been considered in the development of this market 
model and accounted for in market policy.  Like their commercial equivalents, military 
market policies are put in place to take these considerations into account.  Information 
validation, priority queuing, capacity indicators are all examples of market policies that 
help achieve the higher effort required.  Their ability to meet the greater good should be 
tested in model case development and refinement. 
B. FURTHER STUDY 
1. Develop Other Use Cases 
This thesis has explored one market use case.  A Joint Force Command 
operational market should be explored.  Coalition markets for specific areas of 
responsibility focused on ongoing activities such as reconstruction, reconstitution, and 
security.  Disaster relief markets can be set up quickly in familiar transaction spaces a 
place to describe requirements that outside organizations can provide solution to.  A 
multi-department Global War on Terrorism market can be established.  In summary, 
markets work anywhere transactions happen, choices between scarce resources are made 
and demands are present as long as the macro variables described in this thesis are 
present or can be established.  Virtual markets require common transaction access space 
such as the world-wide web or other shared network. 
2. Experimentation 
Like other models, this market model needs to be completed; it needs to continue 
the cycle of model development.  Interpreting this model for use cases, verifying both it 
effective operation and improvements, implementing the model in real world operations 
and maintaining the model are left for further development. Specific markets need to be 
developed, tested and exercised with in the military--their effectiveness validated.   
3. Market Building and Sustaining Processes 
As this thesis is concluding efforts are beginning to develop some small real 
world military markets.  The function/effectiveness of those markets based on this model 
will help validate the concept.  As the concept moves from model development to 
implementation, a market building process is required that will guide the efforts of 
market developers.  Markets are constructed to link consumer and solution provider.  So a 
good starting point to build this market process is to start with the model, identify the 
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macro variables involved, and then to conduct extensive research and interviews to 
capture these needs exactly in the virtual transaction space in order to make market 
participant decision making more effective. 
4. Market Analysis   
Once military markets are developed for experimentation in the DOD, new 
market analysis tools such as error checking and indexing should be developed.  Methods 
that use the advantage of recorded transactions to provide higher level indicators for 
capabilities and force structure.  Markets provide indicators and mechanisms that can fix 
some of our most challenging problems.   
In thesis consultation, Professor John Arquilla suggests several higher level 
analysis methods.  Assessing the error checking and/or mitigation in specific markets 
such as the intelligence market could prove exceptionally valuable.  Does the market 
have a “clearing tendency” that reduces the cycle of bad intelligence assessments?  
Arquilla also suggest that market failures need to be considered.  What would be the 
conditions for and/or types of military market failures short of market depression or 
recession?   
C. TAKE AWAYS 
1. New Solutions- Same Organizations 
In many cases the military is struggling with the realities of warfighting in the 
information age, trying to accomplish better cognitive assessments and determining the 
cascading and ripple effects of operations and reconstruction efforts.  Just one example of 
this information age struggle is the uncertainty surrounding the participants, 
organizational structure, responsibilities, and planning for information operations.  A 
virtual market can help achieve the effects desired in information operations without any 
discrimination about who is able to achieve them.  Perhaps some 90% or more of the 
market solutions are exactly as expected, however markets facilitate new solutions from 
diverse perspectives.  If a new solution’s performance is equivalent or better than the “off 
the shelf” solutions, a new tactic, technique, or procedure has been created.   
The market provides a place to state the information space requirement, to be met 
in sum or part by combining the skills of organizations participating in the market, 
enabling “power to solve.”  These solutions may require creative combinations of talents 
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from a variety of organizations.  Warfare in the information and cognitive space require 
new ways to collaborate and coordinate operational effects and these are not achieved by 
organizational restructure or changes to unit responsibilities.  As organizations start to 
change their approaches to problem solving in this way, their ability to conduct effective 
information operations will evolve and integrated operations can be realized.  This would 
be a significant step in the confused space of information operations today.   
2. Meeting Spectrum of Conflict with Practiced Adhocracy 
This thesis was written with hope that the reader would at least be intrigued by the 
idea that virtual military markets can perform in routine operations and quickly respond 
to the needs of crises.  Markets are extremely effective at the allocation of resources, and 
response to demand. Markets are efficient in peace time, transition to and from hostility, 
and for normal operations for many reasons.  Probably the most significant is allows the 
familiarization and routinization of exchanges and decision making processes in the 
market transaction space.  By routinely focusing solutions to specific tasks, it allows for 
“practiced adhocracy.”   Beyond that, post transaction analysis, indexing, and error 
checking may result in information that is orders of magnitude better than today.  
It is interesting to note that commercial markets are at their best when the 
economy is good – demand is high, and cash is flowing.  Military markets would perform 
at their very best in response to crises and during active operations, because that is when 
military market demand is highest.  Crises and operations require the best solutions 
possible.  Virtual markets present a place for participants to turn for instruction, guidance, 
and a place to quickly state requirements with expectation that they will be met.  Markets 
provide the decision making commander better information and solution alternatives. 
3. Build to Validate  
As this thesis concludes, efforts are being made to build and test drive smaller 
markets for the military, more expansive C4 exercise efforts should be undertaken as 
well.  Virtual markets can be developed to meet a variety of needs, not all are challenges 
to traditional command and control.  Military markets can enable the knowledge and 
power of the many against the asymmetric threats faced by the U.S.  The VMM is an 
alternative C4 structure that should be considered for use today.  Build this market model 
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APPENDIX A. DECISION MAKING IN MILITARY MARKETS 
This appendix shows how the lessons from existing decision making theory and 
tools can contribute to the development of market mechanics.  Markets should be 
developed to provide a cycle of improved information for the decision making 
commander within the market transaction space.  Decision theory and analysis present 
useful considerations for fine tuning markets to make this happen.  
This discussion also shows how the DOD can start to re-emphasize the principles 
of Effects Based Operations (EBO), with the understanding that current operations must 
operate within the realm of current capabilities.  The EBO may not be fully attained 
because the existing DOD tool set can not achieve it.  With market mechanisms the DOD 
can estimate how close to EBO solution it is with available operational choices.   
A. IDEAS FROM DECISION THEORY AND ANALYSIS 
This market model has created a transaction space for receiving alternatives for 
operations and EBO solutions.  How then is a decision made between solutions?  The 
decision maker may have to choose the best option available at the time and may not be 
able to fully achieve an EBO.  The choice of a solution for the operation should be that 
which is closest to actual EBO attainment.  The next section reviews some methods that 
can lead to good decision making for EBO and this market model.   
1. Decision Theory 
Decision theory offers decision makers a structure for problem and solution 
analysis.  One decision theory method combines a capability’s probability of success with 
its utility and reaches an expected value for each choice.  The following definition and 
decision criterion is presented: 
Expected Value is a key concept in probability theory, statistics, and 
decision theory. The expected value of an experiment or strategy is 
obtained by multiplying the value associated with each possible outcome 
of the experiment or strategy by the probability of achieving that outcome, 
and then summing the products of these multiplications. Faced with 
several possible strategies, a decision-maker who is neither very 
conservative nor much of a gambler might be expected to choose the 
strategy having the highest expected value (Castro, 2000, p. 16). 
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The process to reach an expected value has two steps:  First determine subjective 
probability of an outcome.  This is the “degree of belief one has in the likelihood of the 
outcome” (Lyons, p. 543, 1997).  The second step is to provide utilities of the various 
consequences.  Better decisions are made from cardinal values where utilities are 
considered in relationship to each other.  For this to be true for a 1-100 scale, something 
that is 100% likely is twice as likely as something that is 50%.  What is important is the 
ratio of differences between values shows something about the commander’s preference 
(Straffin, 1993).   
By combining a solution’s expected value with the unit’s historical performance 
metrics the best solution available may be identified.  To determine which solution to 
select for an EBO, first the commander should list an EBO by the key attributes to its 
successful accomplishment and provide the importance of that attribute on a cardinal 
scale.  This list of attributes and their cardinal utilities become the decision making 
criteria for the commander.  This is developed further in a decision analysis tool 
discussed in the next section.  
2. Decision Support Analysis  
Figure 8 shows a decision support template and example from the U.S. Army’s 
Logistics Management College.  The spreadsheet depicts five helicopter alternatives for 
an operation.  It follows some, but not all, rules of probability and steps to determine 
expected value.  This spreadsheet illustrates how individual attributes of a decision can be 
assessed for each alternative solution A1 – A5.  The attribute data is entered in the top 
table, and each attribute is ranked by the commander’s importance with a cardinal scale 
on the bottom line of the lower table.  The commander for this solution has ranked 
reliability as the highest priority 100 and maneuverability the second priority at 80.  In 
this model that means that maneuverability is 80% as important as reliability to the 
choice of solution.  Since this is a cardinal scale, each of these attributes can be compared 
in this manner.  Solution A4 has the highest reliability score and is represented with the 
highest utility of 1 all the other solutions receive cardinal utilities compared with this best 
attribute solution.   Each of the other attributes utilities are calculated in the same manner.  
The resulting weighted average in the second table’s right column combines the 
commander’s utilities (bottom line importance) with the normalized attribute utilities for 
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each alternative, and then adds each alternative’s utilities to create a score for the 
decision maker.  
Alternatives Cruise Speed Climb Rate Pay Load Cost Reliable Maneuver
A1 145 580 2625 3.5 7 7
A2 175 415 2750 4.9 5 5
A3 190 500 2700 3 7 3
A4 150 450 2550 2.5 9 7
A5 140 425 2500 5.1 5 5
Ben=1
Cost/Ben 1 1 1 1 1
Alternatives Cruise Speed Climb Rate Pay Load Cost Reliable Maneuver Score
A1 0.76 1.00 0.95 0.71 0.78 1.00 0.86
A2 0.92 0.72 1.00 0.51 0.56 0.71 0.68
A3 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.83 0.78 0.43 0.76
A4 0.79 0.78 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94
A5 0.74 0.73 0.91 0.49 0.56 0.71 0.65
        
        
Importance 35 45 30 60 100 80
Version 4.0
Decision Support System Excel Spreadsheet
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
School of Management Science
Version 4.0
Attributes
Decision Support System Excel Spreadsheet
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
School of Management Science
 
Figure 8.   Weighted Value Score for Army Helicopter Solutions 
There are problems with this weighted value template.  First, it assigns a cardinal 
utility of 1 for the best solution available.  In some cases an attribute may have an 
absolute constraint, and this needs to be considered.  In this Army helicopter example a 
payload may need to be over 2700 lbs to be considered for the mission at all.  In this case, 
then all solutions that do not meet this payload constraint need to be eliminated from the 
acceptable alternatives altogether.  Thus, it must be assumed that all attributes reflected in 
the decision table have met the constraints for each attribute.  If they do not meet the 
constraints, they should be removed as an alternative for selection, regardless of other 
attributes.   
The second problem with this template is that the weighted utilities of each 
attribute are added.  This is one of the fallacies often associated with utility theory, and is 
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equivalent to adding apples and oranges (Straffin, 1993).  In this case the utility scale is 
from one source (the operational commander), still these attribute utilities are not 
necessarily additive.  So, some caution need to be used when reviewing this decision 
model’s results.  However, this additive basis is a common practice when comparing 
alternatives.  The authors of the simple additive weighting model caution that the 
aggregate score needs to be at least 5-7% higher than the next solution to be a definitive 
selection between the options because of the models subjective basis (David, 2004). 
Other methods of comparison could be used instead of adding utilities.  For 
example minimizing risk between attributes or weighted averages of constraints.  Or the 
use of goal programming to maximize value or minimize constraints.  The purpose of this 
illustration is to show the specific benefits of market mechanisms that provide 
information to the operational commander.   By determining the commander’s decision 
criteria the market developer can better refine market mechanisms to provide the 
information needed.  These decision making criteria differ between markets.  For 
example, the qualities of intelligence products on the market are significantly different 
from the criteria for selecting an operational package.  Markets provide a common 
process for making decisions without restricting the commander’s decision basis.  The 
next section illustrates how the commander’s information can be improved for one type 
of operational decision.   
B.  MARKET MECHANISMS FOR IMPROVED DECISION MAKING 
Decision theory and analysis ideas help to set the conditions for setting up market 
mechanisms correctly that result in significantly improved decision making for the 
operational commander.  Market mechanisms can do this first by providing available 
solutions for commanders to choose from and second by providing specific information 
and estimates that better predict the probability for successful attainment of an EBO. This 
second part can be accomplished by a well considered use of the statement of 
requirement, the solution provider’s estimates in bids, and finally by tuning performance 
factors to all of these.  The result is a cycle of better and better information for the 
decision maker.  This section provides the market developer some ideas of how to get 
better information to the decision making commander with market mechanisms.  
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1. Statement of Requirement 
This thesis assumed that the proper analysis was accomplished to state a specific 
EBO to the market.  The best available market decision for achieving these EBO can be 
determined by some additional analysis of commander’s intent, priorities and decision 
making criteria.  What is important to achieve this is to list the attributes necessary for 
operational success, and provide the priority of the commander for each of these within 
the statement of requirement.  The requirement should also state which attributes of the 
operation are constraints; for example if your probability for any one of these constraint 
attributes is below some threshold then it would not be considered as an option.  See an 
example of EBO attributes in Table 2.  Then with bid submission the solution provider 
provides the estimate of success for each attribute. 
EBO example:  Take out a Power Grid at coordinates abc, xyz for a two week 
time period from the beginning of D day until D day + 14. 
Table 3. Attributes, Constraints, and Utility 
Attribute Description Constraint? Weighted 
Importance 
1 Power is taken out Yes ≥ 90% 100 
2 Repairable No 70 
3 Achieve time objective (on time and 
sustained during operation) 
Yes ≥ 80% 80 
4 Coordinated with all related operations No 40 
 
2. Solution Provider Probability Estimates 
For each attribute important for command decision making the solution provider 
should estimate the probability for successful attainment of each.  This helps achieve the 
first step in determining expected value by establishing the subjective probability of each 
attribute.  The solution template should list the EBO and the attributes considered 
important to the commander, see Table 3.  As mentioned earlier, if a solution provider 
provides submits a solution that can not meet certain constraints, it wouldn’t be 
considered an alternative for command decision.  For the EBO mentioned in the 
requirement that means that the probability attribute # 1, take out the power, needs to be 
estimated over 90%; and the probability of the time attribute (# 3) needs to be over 80%. 
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Table 4. Solution Attribute Subjective Probabilities 
Attribute Description Probability  
1 Take out power [1-100] 
2 Repairable [1-100] 
3 Able to achieve time objective (on time 
and sustained during operation) 
[1-100] 
4 Coordinated with all related operations [1-100] 
   
3. Performance Factors 
These probability estimates could be considered in the performance factors 
recorded by the market during post operation assessment.  By measuring a solution 
provider’s ability to accurately estimate the probability of success for achieving certain 
operational attributes, the commander has a better idea about the quality of information 
being received with solutions.  By measuring this as a performance factor, solution 
providers are highly encouraged to provide their best solution estimation.  If the solution 
provider knows that for this EBO that the power grid attribute of repairable can not be 
achieved, the provider should say so with a low probability of attaining that attribute.   
4. Combined Decision Analysis 
Combining the information from these market mechanisms starting from the 
statement of requirement through performance factor is shown in Figure 9 and 10.  This 
uses the attributes sent out by the commander in the requirement template, takes account 
of the subjective probabilities estimates from the solution providers and captures costs 
and historical performance metrics. 
  
85 
Alternatives Pow er Out Repairable Time Period Coord Cost basis Performance
AF Sortie 0.98 0.01 0.98 1 155 96
Hacker 0.9 0.98 0.85 0.6 25 67
Special Ops 0.93 0.6 0.93 0.75 50 85
Army Op 0.85 0.5 0.85 0.7 76 62
Navy Sortie 0.96 0.01 0.96 0.95 125 92
Ben=1
Cost/Ben 1 1 1 1 1
Alternatives Power Out Repairable Time Period Coord Cost basis Performance Score
AF Sortie 1.00 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.76
Hacker 0.92 1.00 0.87 0.60 1.00 0.70 0.88
Special Ops 0.95 0.61 0.95 0.75 0.50 0.89 0.84
Army Op 0.87 0.51 0.87 0.70 0.33 0.65 0.76
Navy Sortie 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.95 0.20 0.96 0.74
        
        
Importance 100 70 80 40 0 0
Version 4.0
Decision Support System Excel Spreadsheet
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
School of Management Science
Version 4.0
Attributes
Decision Support System Excel Spreadsheet
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
School of Management Science
 
Figure 9.   EBO Decision Matrix 
Each of these solutions meets the constraints set by the requesting commander.  In 
Figure 9 the commander doesn’t have cost or past performance weighted in the solution 
(see importance line).  Notice in this first estimation of the solution without consideration 
of the solution provider’s historical performance, the hacker solution has the highest 
score.  However, in Figure 10 when past performance is valued equally with the most 
significant attribute, the special operations solution gets a better score.  The scores in 
these example are too close to determine a definitive choice, however the commander has 
better information about the solutions under consideration and all solutions that do not 
meet critical constraints have been eliminated. 
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Alternatives Pow er Out Repairable Time Period Coord Cost basis Performance
AF Sortie 0.98 0.01 0.98 1 155 96
Hacker 0.9 0.98 0.85 0.6 25 67
Special Ops 0.93 0.6 0.93 0.75 50 85
Army Op 0.85 0.5 0.85 0.7 76 62
Navy Sortie 0.96 0.01 0.96 0.95 125 92
Ben=1
Cost/Ben 1 1 1 1 1
Alternatives Power Out Repairable Time Period Coord Cost basis Performance Score
AF Sortie 1.00 0.01 1.00 1.00 0.16 1.00 0.82
Hacker 0.92 1.00 0.87 0.60 1.00 0.70 0.83
Special Ops 0.95 0.61 0.95 0.75 0.50 0.89 0.85
Army Op 0.87 0.51 0.87 0.70 0.33 0.65 0.73
Navy Sortie 0.98 0.01 0.98 0.95 0.20 0.96 0.80
        
        
Importance 100 70 80 40 0 100
Version 4.0
Decision Support System Excel Spreadsheet
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
School of Management Science
Version 4.0
Attributes
Decision Support System Excel Spreadsheet
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
School of Management Science
 
Figure 10.   EBO Decision Matrix with Performance 
Additional analysis of the criteria can distinguish the alternatives by the least 
amount of risk: as a sum, average, or by weighted average risk depicted in Figure 11.  In 
this decision analysis the lower the risk the better.   In all cases when past performance is 
considered-- the Special Operations solution is the best option.  Throughout this example 
the cost basis has not used in the estimation of risk and hasn’t been identified by the 
commander as part of his decision criteria.     
87 
Alternatives Pow er Out Repairable Time Period Coord Cost basis Performance
AF Sortie 0.98 0.01 0.98 1 155 96
Hacker 0.9 0.98 0.85 0.6 25 67
Special Ops 0.93 0.6 0.93 0.75 50 85
Army Op 0.85 0.5 0.85 0.7 76 62
Navy Sortie 0.96 0.01 0.96 0.95 125 92
Alternatives Pow er Out Repairable Time Period Coord Cost basis Performance
AF Sortie 0.02 0.99 0.02 0 0 0.04
Hacker 0.1 0.02 0.15 0.4 0 0.33
Special Ops 0.07 0.4 0.07 0.25 0 0.15
Army Op 0.15 0.5 0.15 0.3 0 0.38
Navy Sortie 0.04 0.99 0.04 0.05 0 0.08
Importance 100 70 80 40 0 100
Alt Sum Risk Avg Risk Wt Risk
AF Sortie 1.07 0.214 0.197179
Hacker 1 0.2 0.185641
Special Ops 0.94 0.188 0.168205
Army Op 1.48 0.296 0.287179




Figure 11.   Alternatives and Attributes by Risk 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The information provided by the market contributes to improved decision making.  
Careful consideration should be made when developing the transactions in the market 
that focus this.  This appendix presented just a few ideas from decision theory that can be 
easily captured when using market mechanisms.  As mentioned earlier, the decision 
making criteria by market type and even specific decisions may vary.  What is important 
to the market transaction process is that it facilitates the presentation of decision criteria 
in a meaningful manner so that it can be met by solution providers.  This decision making 
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APPENDIX B. VMM PRESENTATION 
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: VIRTUAL MILITARY MARKETS 
• The Virtual Military Market (VMM) Intelligence use case (V-MIM) starts to 
paint the picture of how E-Bay like markets can be utilized by DOD to 
improve the intelligence C4 process.  Profitability doesn’t matter to the DOD; 
however effective distributed operation capabilities-- especially for decision 
making and information sharing does matter. The V-MIM use case explains 
how virtual markets are planned transaction space for “practiced adhocracy” 
and advocates for experimentation and exercise for validation of the concept. 
• The force transformation buzz words “self-synchronizing” and “demand 
driven” are words that have been associated with markets throughout history.  
Consumers drive markets and create opportunities for solution providers to 
meet the demands—in other words markets synchronize supply and demand.  
MIT’s Professor Thomas Malone introduced the concept of internal markets 
to answer the needs for alternative C4 mechanisms with today’s technology.   
• Markets are an organizational principle and a means of thinking about 
coordination that have existed since the Byzantine Empire.  Both adhocracy 
and markets may be evil terms for the military.  In organizational theory, 
markets are at the very outer edge of adhocracy, they are not really 
organizational forms at all, but transaction spaces between individuals and 
organizations that focus relationship and exchanges based on resolving 
requirements.   
• A new breed of market, called a virtual market, has emerged at the 
intersection of markets and information technology.  These markets provide 
extensive reach to the most distant of consumers.  Today the web offers 
virtual markets such as E-Bay and Amazon.  Something closer to what is 
being illustrated here is called Elance.  Elance is a professional services 
market that allows accountants, web designers, translators and others to bid on 
buyer requirements.  E-Bay, Amazon, and Elance are good examples of global 
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markets, enabled by information technology.  These information age markets 
are available to anyone with internet access, and enable the realization of 
another transformation phrase, Power to the Edge.  
• Virtual markets are not technically difficult; they have just extended the reach 
of the consumer and supplier.  This fact is the key to market utility - no matter 
how complex virtual markets are used, what is important about them is their 
ability to link the demand of consumers with the innovation of suppliers.  
Translating that into the military environment, virtual military markets are 
able to respond to the needs of the Joint Forces Commander’s demands for:  
information and intelligence, new solution sets for effects-based operations, 
and reach to remote & specialized skills of all types.  The C4 demands of 
routine operations, crises and planning can be met by the VMM.    
• Markets are efficient in normal peacetime operations for many reasons.  Both 
familiarity and routine are gained in making transactions in this market space, 
always increasing the quality of the decision maker’s information and solution 
sets.  In other words normal operations allow for “practiced adhocracy”.  
Market analysis, indexing and error detection can provide indicators and 
mechanisms that can fix some of our most challenging intelligence problems. 
• Commercial markets are at their best when the economy is good, demand is 
high, and cash is flowing.  Military markets, also driven by demand, would 
meet their challenge, and perform at their very best, in response to crises and 
during operational situations because that is when military demand is highest.  
Imagine a new crises event- reaction is needed immediately- the VMM 
presents a place for military forces to turn for instruction, guidance, and a 
place for commanders to state requirements and have some expectations that 
solutions will be created for their consideration. The VMM is a C4 process 
model for today. 




Major Angela Burth, USAF
Student, Naval Postgraduate School
September 2005
My name is Maj Angela Burth, I am an AF Comm officer, currently at NPS pursuing 
a MS degree in Info Ops.  This fall I join the JCS’s CIO Office at the Pentagon.
I started thinking about E-Bay like markets for the military last fall in Prof John 
Arquilla’s Warfare in the Information Age class.  He presented the idea of posting 
operations on an E-Bay type website to be grabbed by special ops troops.  That 
nugget sparked a thought in my mind of not just posting operations but actually 
“marketizing” the choice of forces by costs and performance factors. I thought about 
this a bit, and encouraged by Prof Arquilla to “hold on to that thought”, I decided to 
explore markets in my Thesis. I had a brief discussion with Prof Dorothy Denning, 
about the topic at the start of winter classes in January.  The Denning family is 
communicating!  The next day I met Professor Peter Denning and Professor Sue 
Higgins; Dr. Denning wanted me to work a deal with EBay to get the market 
software and start to develop the market.  My response-- develop what..?  
In two winter classes with Prof D. Denning, I explored both the cyber side of 
markets and their social network organizational structures.  I accomplished a related 
literature search and leveraged my MBA and org design courses.  I uncovered 
ideas about internal markets from Prof Thomas Malone at MIT, and I referred back 
to lessons of force and idea swarming from Prof Arquilla. I found important need 
statements that I felt markets could meet from the DSB, OFT, and CCRP.   
I then translated the virtual markets we are all familiar with into the military 
environment & rule sets.  How many of you have been on EBay, Amazon? Closer to 
what I’m trying to accomplish here is Elance, a profession services market that asks 
for solutions from accountants, web designers, translators and others.
This brief takes that one step further, and start to paint you a picture…of how virtual 




 Why markets for the military?
 Today’s intelligence needs
 Intelligence markets prescribed
 Market concept of operations
 Way ahead – how to validate
Before going into the details of this case presentation I want you to consider the 
following. When you hear the words “self-synchronizing” or “demand driven” what 
do you think of?  Besides being force transformation buzz words, these words have 
been associated with markets throughout history.  What drives markets?  
Technology?  No, consumers drive markets and create opportunity for solution 
providers to meet their demands. Markets synchronize supply and demand.  
What is interesting about markets when combined with information technology?  A 
new breed of market, called a virtual market, has emerged.  Markets that provide 
extensive reach to the most distant of consumers.  E-Bay, Amazon, and Elance are 
examples of global markets, enabled by information technology.  These information 
age markets are available to anyone with internet access, and that brings to mind 
another transformation phrase.  Power to the edge. Profitability doesn’t matter to the 
DOD; however effective distributed operation capabilities especially for decision 
making and information sharing does matter. 
Now a technologist could purport the complexity of these markets and use words 
like “complex adaptive system or network”, but what does that mean anyway?  To 
the bane of all engineers and technologists alike it means that there are humans 
involved! The problem must consider the chaos of human decision making and can 
not be solved with pure technology strategies.  Virtual markets are not that 
technically complex, they have just extended the reach of the consumer and 
supplier.  That is the key to markets, no matter how complexly they are employed, 
what is important to the market isn’t technology but a process that links the demand 
of consumers with the innovation of suppliers.  Keep this in mind when thinking 
through how virtual market mechanisms can be translated into military operations 
and organization.  Not a difficult technical solution; but an organizational principle 
and means of thinking about coordination used since the Byzantine Empire.
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Virtual Markets for DOD?




 Less formal structures
 Environment complex and dynamic
 Markets are added, changed, removed based on 
demand
 Commercial Markets are at their best during “good times”
 Military markets are at their best in response to crises & ops
 Virtual Military Markets are Planned Transaction 
Space for “Practiced Adhocracy”
Both adhocracy and markets are almost evil terms in the military.  In organizational 
design markets are at the very outer edge of adhocracy and are really not 
organizational forms at all, but are transaction spaces between individuals and 
organizations that facilitate relationship and exchanges.  By the end of this 
presentation I hope your are at least intrigued with the ideas that virtual military 
markets can perform in routine operations and quickly respond to the needs of 
crises.  Markets are extremely effective at the allocation of resources, and response 
to demand.  
It is interesting to note that commercial markets are at their best when the economy 
is good – demand is high, and cash is flowing while military markets would perform 
their very best in response to crises situations because that is when demand is 
highest: image a new crises event, where reaction is needed immediately, virtual 
markets present a place for everyone to turn for instruction, guidance, and a place 
to state requirements and have some expectation that they will be met.  
Markets are efficient in peace time as well for normal operations for many reasons.  
Probably the most significant is allows the familiarization and routinization of 
exchanges and decision making processes in the market transaction space.  In 
other words it allows for practiced adhocracy.  Markets also provide indicators and 
mechanisms that can fix some of our most challenging problems.  Indeed demand 
drives markets in the military and commercial worlds.  With that analogy what does 




Why DOD Needs Virtual Markets 
 Address operational collaboration and control shortfalls 
in response to new security threats
 Present processes that can address the calls from OFT, 
DSB, CCRP for:
 Power to the edge
 Decentralized command and control
 Cognitive reach to solve problems differently
 Bottom line: market processes combined 
with virtual transaction spaces are powerful 
collaboration and coordination tools for 
today’s security environment
Certainly the challenges of asymmetric warfare and 4th 
Generation Warfare will keep the US military guessing for 
years to come.  This presentation will show how many 
present limitations and shortfalls can resolved with 
collaborative market processes & practiced adhocracy.  
Markets focus on demand, and perhaps change how we 
come up with and how we think about solutions.  Virtual 
Military Markets empower the many to come up with 
solutions for the Joint Forces Commander.  It does not take 
the selection of those solutions away from the commander.  
I walk through a very specific use case for the intelligence 





 Markets are transaction spaces between multiple 
organizations & individuals
 Internal Markets are within an organization that allow 
for the decentralization of command and control 
 Virtual Markets allow far reaching market transactions
 Adhocracy
 The absence of hierarchy/bureaucracy 
 Relationships focused by purpose to its completion
 Common/familiar transaction language used daily 
= “practiced adhocracy”
Here are some of the organizational principles that are 
involved in markets.  This thesis combines the ideas of Henry 
Mintzberg’s taxonomy of organizational Forms and Thomas 
Malone’s alternative organizational structure that can meet the 
challenges of command and control in the information age.
6
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Functions of Internal Markets
 A forum for exchange
 An arena for competition
 An avenue for choice
 A process for endorsement/external validation
 A mechanism for resource allocation
 A kind of social network
(Välikangas & Hamel, 2001)
Here are some of the functions of internal markets presented 
by a pair of researchers in 2001. Markets are not just for 
capitalist purposes. What is important for internal markets is 
finding the right incentives that encourage exchanges.  It could
be that in DOD markets, prices or common values wouldn’t 
even be exchanged, perhaps resource use is simply recorded.  
However as I will show later, the record of these transactions 
provide powerful after action analysis.
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Getting Past Biases 
 Internal markets mechanisms can be used 
without profit motivation – use other incentives
 Markets are incentive-based transaction spaces 
designed to facilitate exchange & meet demands
 Market mechanisms and structures do not 
replace organizations—although they may 
provide indicators for long term change
There is a military cognitive bias against markets: “cost 
savings” and profit do not necessarily fit with military activities.  
As I have just talked about markets may be used for other than 
capitalistic motivations and they do not replace organizational 
structures they allow organizations and individuals to make 
transactions in virtual space.
8
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Internal Markets in Hierarchies
 World Bank Development Market Place
 Two days, participants from around the world
 $300 million available for the top 300 projects
 Royal Dutch/Shell Oil GameChanger
 Employees, select universities, partners
 Existed on 1% its own revenues in 2000
 IBM alphaWorks
 Releases new software modules to get feedback from 
developers—who get a head start in development
Here are a couple of examples of Internal Markets used in 
traditional hierarchies that were very successful.
The World bank searched for grass roots project ideas in a 
market place, the result was that 4 of 9 highest priorities of the 
World Bank 2001 came from that marketplace.
Shell’s GameChanger division comes up with new innovations 
for the corporation, it successfully produced 4/5 largest growth
opportunities for the company.
And IBM’s alphaWorks project releases new code to 
developers on the condition that they provide feedback.  This 
gives the developer a head start on technical development.  





 9/11 Report 
 Restructure of intelligence community
 Increased information sharing with incentives
 Incentives to stop hoarding information to 
bolster organizations position--black holes
 Change what is valued by the community
 From “Need to know…to Need to share”
Expressions of intelligence needs are pervasive.  The 9-11 
report summarizes two primary need for the intelligence 
community.  The need for the community to restructure and to 
increase information sharing with incentives.
What is repeatedly found in most criticisms of the intelligence 
community are the messages in the second bullet.  Stop 
hording, change what is valued by the community, change the 
culture from need to know to need to share.  These are 
criticism are found in many readings as you will see in the next
slides




 Measures that show efficient analysis, collection, and 
operations support
 Changed transactions processes & structures to meet 
the goal of agility
 Access to value added expertise that is flexible and has 
surge analyst capacity
 Improved requirements process
 Creation of intelligence reserve for crises
 Properly balance redundancy and duplication  for 
competitive analysis
(Lowenthal, 2003)
Here is a summary of intelligence needs presented by Mark 
Lowenthal in his 2003 book, Intelligence from secrets to policy.
Lowenthal p. 224 in Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: from 
Secrets to Policy, (Washington, D.C., CQ Press: 2003)  
Intelligence reform chapter “volumes of reports or “batting 





 Intelligence sharing out of stovepipes
 Timely & relevant HUMINT information
 Intel officers with increased social network skills 
and established relationships with counterparts 
in other organizations
 Alternative (competing) hypotheses
 Protracted nature of the requirement
 Global network of networks- all nodes are users 
and producers of intel (Grau, 2004)
(Sullivan & Bunker, 2002)
Similar statements to meet the needs of counterinsurgency 
intel shown in two articles here.
Guerrillas, terrorists, and intelligence analysis: something old, 
something new Lester W. Grau
Multilateral counter-insurgency networks from John P. Sullivan 




 Lessons learned from Afghanistan
 Need for culturally centric HUMINT
 Few US intel organizations could contribute 
“actionable” intelligence post kinetic phase
 Need to focus intel community on tactical operator
 Push collection and analysis downward
 Creation of global scout experts
 Leverage learning sciences-increase skills
(Scales, 2004)
The Need for Culturally centric intelligence tactics and 
HUMINT is presented by MGen (Ret) Scales in a Sept 2004 
Proceedings article on Culture-Centric Warfare
Scales, R Jr. (2004). Naval Institute Proceedings.  Cultural-




Views From the Field
 “I could probably get more usable intelligence from a séance,”
quips one officer with recent Iraq experience.
 “Ultimately, if you collect [intelligence] but don’t disseminate it to 
the warfighter, it’s useless,” says one officer recently returned from 
Iraq. “You’re just soaking up electrons in the atmosphere.”
 “The intelligence community is so layered and so 
compartmentalized that the only secrets they keep are from 
themselves,” says one Marine officer who has served in Iraq, 
speaking only somewhat in jest.”
(Grossman, 2005)
Some recent field comments about intelligence.




Why a Virtual Intelligence Market?
 Increase focus on the intel consumer
 Common process and language for transactions for the 
entire community
 “One stop shop” for consumers & analysts
 Focus on “need to share” to meet demand
 Meet the need for counter hypothesis
 Provide incentive that motivate the “Need to share”
 Qualitative measurements of intelligence
 Bottom line:  A process that adds value and 
start to change the intelligence community 
that we can do today
For this question … A virtual intelligence market makes sense 





 A collaborative environment dedicated to 
space and global strike, missile defense, 
information operations, and global ISR
 Enables users to draw upon the products and skill of 
global component commands 
 Provide tailored information based on consumption 
needs  -“ end-running” the problem
 “It’s not a technical issue anymore”
(Grossman, 2005)
Recently General Cartwright, Command US Strategic 
Command presented this prescription. This looks very 
familiar… a collaborative environment, reach to global 
component, to meet consumption need.  
from Inside The Pentagon by Elaine M. Grossman May 5, 
2005




Virtual Tactical Fusion Centers
 Marine Corps Tactical Fusion Center-- Iraq
 Meet intel needs of forward ops units (in context, relevant)
 Meet higher headquarters’ intel needs
 Excellent model for how to handle information overload of 
the tactical & operational commander
 Individual focused support on a few operators
 New virtual tactical fusion capability from a world-wide 
market
 Initial response from the world-wide market
 Develop new adhoc working relationships-quickly
 Taking care of a few units--get smart fast 
I want to highlight one lesson learned from the field.  The 
Marine Corp’s development of a tactical fusion center is a well 
though idea.  It places the right emphasis on the forward 
operator while accommodating the needs of higher 
headquarters.   It focuses specific resources to the guy on the 
ground.  In much the same way by accessing a virtual market 
an operator can get the response of a world-wide market, and 
at the same time establish new adhoc working relationships.  
The market is suited to the scale of large and small as well as 
short and long term needs.  This isn’t reach back or reach 
forward this is “all reach”.
The Tactical Fusion Center (Groen, 2005)
Assigned forward units = advocacy cell, forward position 





 Who are the buyers?
 Who are the sellers?
 What products or service solutions are 
exchanged? 
 Incentives to provide solutions- recorded 
transactions
 Money (budget and billets)
 Ratings (how well I did it)
 Status (I was involved!)
No matter what market you are trying to establish.  These are 
the basics.  Who are the consumers? Who are the solution 
providers?  What are they exchanging?  What are the 
incentives for the exchange?
The exchanged cost basis may never equate to dollars for the 
organization or perhaps with changed legislation they could 
between U.S. Departments.  These transaction records could 
definitely be used by decision makers at all levels for 
determining budgets and billets in the DOD.  For national 
agencies, this score card could be used differently.  Cost basis
exchanged with transaction is probably an indirect incentive for
participation, and not used so much for choices.  Valuable 
information for commander’s to use for future decision making.  
Running total of how well solution providers are doing.  Record 
of who did what where, even from remote access.  A firm 
count of contribution and involvement.
Notes: Reward scheme based on observables – outcome of success or failure 
(imperfect link to effort), success = bonus, fine for failure; also called equity sharing;  
get by what can’t be observed; other observable= success/failure of previous project 
(also inexact), but better with more observations; two ways =historical record of 
performance or compare with others.  Dixit, A., & Nalebuff. B (1991). Pgs 305-306. 18
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Intelligence Market Prescribed
 Variety of exchanges in the intel process
 Ops & Planning Intelligence requirements 
 Raw data 
 Asset and resource tasking
 Field data submission
 Feedback for all products and databases
 Costs/value recorded in transactions
 Choice of existing consumer product template or 
tailored 
 SIPRNET market for all INT
There are a variety of exchanges involved in the intelligence 
process today.  A market mechanism can facilitate them all
Added to these, the virtual military market would have 
exchanges of feedback and performance ratings, some cost or 
value basis, and consumer format preferences.  The Virtual 
Military Intelligence Market should be developed as an “All 
INT” market on the SIPRNET.
Examples:
Operational intelligence requirements: such as battle damage 
assessment.
Planning intelligence requirements:  adversary or country 
studies and target identification. 
Raw data requirement by intelligence analysts.  
Asset and resource tasking:  collection brokers to respond to 
intelligence requirements































Sellers: Submit a 
Solution Bid



















I start to paint the picture of the intelligence market and 
discuss the use case at the requirement template instead of 
the broader market environment because this is what drives 
the market.  This is what I as a consumer, the buyer, the 
commander need from the market to get my job done.  
Without this, a market need not be established.  
Here it is an online form. This template would show the 
required fields by selected intelligence category.  This is an 
example of an IMINT template.  When a consumer fills it out, 
his organization and contact information are automatically filled 
in, as well as the operation he is involved with and request 
date.  The request date is kept updated until submitted to the 
market. The buyer fills in the needed NLT time, and delivery 
instructions. Another network may need to be used to actually 
exchange the data.  (Much the same as choosing between 
FEDEX and US Mail) Buyers can select Automatic or flagged 
updates. Users can place a priority on the requirement where 
priority 3 is normal, priority 2 high priority, and priority 1 Life or 
death can be selected by the consumer, but must be validated 















Request release of images to coalition partners














Recent photos of coordinates xx,  xxx; xx, xxx; use product 
NGA-X2000, in resolutions xxxxx
Sellers: Submit a 
Solution Bid























When the template is submitted, the solution providers 
are notified of new requirement in the market that they 
can potentially fill, and market brokers are notified at the 
same time.  Here the broker has validated a priority one 
requirement.  The broker would also help choose solution 
provider from bids (field operator request). The broker 
becomes involved with high priority requirements if there 
was no response in a given time to a high priority 
requirement, he will invite solution providers based on 
organizational capacity.
Solution providers submit solution bids directly from the 
requirement template with all or some: List of prepared 
products (push products); List of database with relevant 
material and specific items that consumers already have 
access to; or Tailored product estimates.
The buyer in the intelligence market can take all solution 
providers’ products, some or none. At this time there isn’t 
a budget on the consumer, for intel, various analysis and 




Home VMM   News BUYERS      SELLERS RESOURCES















































Like other virtual markets, the top level will direct your actions 
based on your purpose in the market to buy products or sell 
products.  
Buyers can post requirements, search for resources or 
capabilities, and take a look at the Org profiles for 
organizations participating in the operation.  Sellers can 
register, search all requirements or by go the an active 
operation or the intelligence market for it.
Other market links are available, such as the markets of the 
combatant command, functional commands, & links to other 




Home VMM   News BUYERS      SELLERS RESOURCES




















































































Create Intel Org Profile
View Requirements (in priority 
order)




View Intel Org Profiles
The OIF intel market again directs the user based on how he 
is participating.
The buyer- posting a project, searching for available resources 
or capabilities, browsing organizations.
The seller- reviewing requirements by priority or specialty.  The 
market  shows or link to hot intel requirements, high priority 
intel requirements, and unmet needs.  List of resources for OIF 
are also listed
Another useful link would be a capacity warning list that shows 
organizations at or reaching their capacity.  This page has 
links back to the OIF market.
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Create Intel Org Profile






View Intel Org Profiles












































Navy US Coast Guard
AF SIGINT: The AF SIGINT resources 
incude xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx x  xxxxxxx




NAVY SIGINT: Navy SIGINT resources 
include xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx x  xxxxxxx




NSA SIGINT The NSA SIGINT provides 
xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx x  xxxxxxx









CLICK HERE FOR LIST OF ISR ASSETS
These are the organization profiles that are active in the OIF 
Intel Market, representing both assigned and invited 
organizations.
Here the user has selected to view the SIGINT Profiles active 
in OIF.  The listing displays the current used capacity of the 
organization, its average ratings, and the amount of product it 
has produced for this market.  They can also view the profiles 
by service or by (next slide)
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Navy US Coast Guard
National Geo-Spatial Intelligence 
Agency (NGA): NGA provides imagery, 




(NSA): The NSA is xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx





Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The 
CIA is xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx x  xxxxxxx












CLICK HERE FOR LIST OF ISR ASSETS












































Navy US Coast Guard
National Geo-Spatial Intelligence 
Agency (NGA): NGA provides imagery, 




(NSA): The NSA is xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx





Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The 
CIA is xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx x  xxxxxxx












CLICK HERE FOR LIST OF ISR ASSETS
Here the user want to take a look at the profile page for the 
National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).
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National Geo-Spatial Intelligence 
Agency (NGA) www.nga.smil.mil
Home VMM   News BUYERS      SELLERS RESOURCES
V-MIM
OIF Organizational Profile
Avg Capacity =  75%
NGA provides imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial data and information in support of national security.
Products: Newsletter
Databases Taskable Asset Satellites
GEOnet Names Server (GNS) IKONOS 99%
Digital Point Positioning Database (DPPDB) Radarsat 65%
Digital Nautical Chart Databases (DNC®)
Analysis Products  Analyst Capacity 70%
Pan sharpened imagery 3D Views - TIR
MSI Target Identification Geospatial Intelligence Fusion
SAR Target Identification TIR Target Identification
D&D Verification Material Analysis
3D Views – MSI Terrain Categorization
3D Views – SAR
Contact:   Ed Bickford
egbickford@nga.smil
Feedback Summary
Feedback Reviews:  10
Earnings:  $3,288
Avg Rating:  4.5
View All Feedback
Go To VMM Go To V-MIM
VMM ID:  N-007
Supported Operations 
This is a look at NGAs organizational profile page.  The page 
should show all products available from an organization, it 
should list its taskable assets and show both asset and 
analysts capacity. This is an important record of capabilities 
present on the market. 
The individual product pages will present a portfolio of 
available user formats, and their reference number for the 
requirement template.  A list of supported operations and/or 
AORs should also be available.  A link to all of the 




Field Data & Ops Debrief Interface
 Exchange for sensor/shooter information
 Patrols, checkpoints, drivers, and aircrew 
debriefs can provide excellent HUMINT
 Incentives (price) for this information
 Intel officer entered then validated by broker 
before release to debrief database
 Database interface template
 Database & items rated by consumers
Another important template that should be developed is this 
field data and ops debrief interface to facilitate the exchange of 
our own field operator HUMINT.  This would go (among other 
places) into one of the market’s organic databases – a Field 
Data Repository.  An operations template would be developed 
that offered a selection of formats from a pull down menu (for 
example aircrew or ops unit post mission HUMINT report).  
This information would be filled in by a debriefer or ops 
personnel, and depending on market rules, the information 
would be routed to brokers for validation and release to the 
field debrief database.  The operator & broker may flag the 
priority of the information to show up in HOT topics for the 
operational and intelligence markets.
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OIF Database Listing Page
 List of all OIF relevant databases with link to 
them or link information (to other networks)
 Link to all databases in V-MIM
 Subscription rates (yearly, monthly rates)
 Capacity of subscriptions - how many 
subscriptions issued vs. how many planned for
 Follow individual links to database portfolio 
page that has-examples of product in database 
and database subscription sign up 
A database listing pages can be accessed at various levels 
that show relative information for the operation.  Users are 
offered a link to the entire database listing of the V-MIM as 
well that captures intelligence products produced in the VMIM 





 Skilled intelligence market personnel
 Validators for field data & release to database
 Provide situational awareness and links between ops & 
analyst to facilitate requirement flow
 Today’s JTF, JIC & Service “J2” shops 
 Monitor market for flows
 Validate & prioritize requirements
 Invite special skilled analysts & assets based on priority 
requirements 
 Collection mangers
 Agency brokers (DIA, CIA, NGA, NSA)
Brokers are important in the intelligence market and have 
a number of roles and various locations.  Brokers along 
with market policy are intended to make up where Adam 
Smith’s Laissez-Faire- the invisible hand- will not meet 
the collective military needs, as argued by John Nash 
who finds the need for market policies and arbitration.
Illustrations:
In some cases information exchanges are automatically exchanged, in the 
case of subscriptions to pull databases or push products.  In other cases, 
such as an intelligence requirement coming out of the field, brokers with 
situational awareness need to translate field information requirements into an 
intelligence requirement for the market.  Brokers are present as skilled 
members of the Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC)s, 
or direct unit support intelligence officers.  Brokers are also needed at the 
national level production centers to determine their agency availability and 
relevance.  Collection managers are also necessary brokers for tasking 
assets.  Depending on how a requirement is submitted to the market, many 
of these brokers may get a heads up ping that a new requirement is present, 
and start their organizations response. JIC or unit level brokers may need to 
validate new information coming out of the field, quickly.  This allows the 
information to become part of the operational and intelligence picture.  
Brokers in all of these circumstances need the social network skills of 
knowing just where the expertise is present in the intelligence market for 
specific information. 32
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Examples of Market Indicators
 Capacity utilization trends
 Aggregate record of demand and transactions
 Participation level of organizations & assets
 Unmet requirements (shortfalls)
 Performance measurements
 Record of unique products and solutions
Here are just a few examples of post transaction analysis 
indicators that should be apparent after a period of market 






 Cost Determinates (human, product, database)
 Performance Metrics and Feedback
 Demand Counts and Capacity indicators
 Prioritization of Requirements
 Refinement of Requirements to achieve EBO
 How market mechanisms work together to 
improve decision making
These are other market items that I have considered for the 
use case, many of these have slides in the market 
mechanisms section in the back of this brief.  All of these are 





 Community On-Line Intelligence System for 
End-Users and Managers
 Automated requirements - production
 IMINT some SIGINT
 Centralized database of products
 Access to current intelligence products
 Quantity metrics & some quality measures
Some of the capabilities presented here exist today in the Community 
On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers (COLISEUM) 
automated production and requirements management system.  
COLISEUM improves the process for priority requirements by 
automating registration, validation, and production assignment and 
allowing deconflicted on-line scheduling of intelligence products.  It 
provides an automated method of tracking and monitoring production 
requirements and production scheduling.  COLISEUM achieves a 
centralized database with remote access.  It provides graphical 
reporting and is a starting point for metric development for performance 
standards.   It increases flexibility with efficient data retrieval for 
analysts.  “COLISEUM also provides a requestor/validator capability 
through IntelLink to access current intelligence products i.e.: National 
Intelligence Daily, Military Intelligence Digest, NMJIC Executive 
Highlights, Defense Intelligence Report, Daily Intelligence Highlights, 
Chairman’s Morning Brief, etc.” (Pike, 2002). 
Intelligence analysts suggest that the metrics provided by COLISEUM 
are being used as the source of unit level performance metrics. This 
database is installed at all Combatant Commands, DOD production 
centers, DIA, CIA, NSA, Joint Intelligence Centers, and Service 
equivalents.  COLISEUM also provides the products created in a 






 Market incentives to share
 Recorded values of information
 Registered profiles and products
 Feedback on all products
 Consumer & analyst “one stop shop”
 Field data validation and access
 Social network & broker knowledge
COLISEUM offers many useful features, some of which would be replicated in the 
VMIM.  So, what is missing?  COLISEUM transactions take place primarily on the 
Top Secret network and are out of reach for many operational units.  COLISEUM 
doesn’t record a value basis, or record of resources with the transactions and 
records only some of the transactions present in the Intelligence Community today, 
primarily IMINT.  Pure quantity of production is not a good measure of success and 
demand should be recorded for all units, assets, and types of products available in 
the market.  COLISEUM is also not well connected to operational market.  
COLISEUM doesn’t yet handle all types of intel and isn’t a one stop shop for 
operator, commander, or analyst.  
The market model provides a value basis missing in COLISEUM.  It facilitates the 
exchange of all intelligence regardless of its source or classification. The market 
records and encourages transactions at a lower classification to better facilitate the 
needs of operators.  The VMIM uses market mechanics and incentives that focus 
the utilization of resources and analysis capabilities to meet requirements by having 
solution providers estimate their ability to answer requirements on time, rather than 
tasking what is thought to be the best solution.  VMIM brokers make it their 
business to answer as many intelligence requirements as possible, and assure that 
priority and time sensitive requirements are met.  Where many requirements 
disappear into the cyberspace of COLISEUM today, consumers of the VMIM will 
know who is, or is not, working the requirement, and if solutions are available by the 
record on the requirement and/or solution template.  Bottom line, the VMIM offers a 
transaction space focused on meeting demands with incentives to do it and gains 




 Experiment in exercise for validation - proof
 Develop this market model using generic market 
software and place it on the SIPRNET
 Intel/Ops participants with national agencies
 Specific Validations
 Market can meet time to respond
 Broker roles
 Demand, capacity, & cost factors performing
 Improvements over existing process
Here’s what is needed next, experimentation, what Professor 
Peter Denning wanted me to do in January.
In this case exercises could be accomplished in the virtual 
spaces, by volunteer organizations, far removed.
I propose that this intelligence be developed on the SIPRNET.  
While not all data exchanges can take place there, transaction 
records can  happen in one market.  Here is a list of specific 
validations to accomplish.  So then what? How do we know 





Prove with experimentation = measurably better than 
today
 Increase focus on the intel consumer and provide tailored 
analysis for operational needs
 Provide a common process and language for IC transactions
 Create a “one stop shop” for consumers & analysts for all 
intelligence transactions
 Provide incentives that improve intelligence sharing and 
collaboration and change intelligence community focus to “need 
to share” to fill consumer demands
 Routinize data management & validation from operational and 
HUMINT sources
Here is a list of items that can actually measured during and 
after experimentation.  I suggest that they would all be proved 




 Increase awareness of organizational and community 
capabilities and skills
 Better prioritize intelligence requirements globally, 
regionally and locally.
 Utilize otherwise unused analysis capabilities (spare 
capacity)
 Reach remote specialized skills and analysis
 Provide a common transaction space for multi –
intelligence products 
 Provide a single process for crisis and routine 






New or added values not present today
 Intelligence quality indicators and measures of 
effectiveness
 Increased incentives for competitive analysis and 
alternative hypothesis
 Provide intelligence database administrators with feedback 
measures
 Increase awareness of organizational capabilities/skills
 Provide new knowledge management
 Post transaction analysis and error checking
Here is a list of Metrics and incentives that are new for 
intelligence markets, these would provide improvements that 
are not present today.  They would simply be demonstrated 
with experimentation.
The combination of these intelligence improvement leads to a 
cycle of improved information for the decision making 
commander.  For a more detailed summary of this topic, see 




 Iraq coalition coordination markets for 
reconstruction, reconstitution, security
 Disaster relief markets
 JFC operational market- ideally the intelligence 
market is part of a “market of markets”
 GWOT multi-department market
Other places for markets?  Anywhere transactions happen, 
choices between scarce resources are made and demands 
are present.
I have presented an intelligence market as one use case.  I’m 
sure you can think of your own virtual markets locations.  
Ultimately the virtual military market is in a “market of markets”
that gives the Joint Forces Commander all the information, 
knowledge skill, & force selection options available to develop 
the best coarse of action for an Effects Based Operation.  





Virtual Military Markets are 
Planned Transaction Space for 
“Practiced Adhocracy”
My question for you, have I gotten you even close to 
understanding that markets are planned transaction spaces for 
practiced adhocracy?  Are you intrigued enough about 
markets in the military to consider the idea for the next step: 
experimentation.   I open the floor for discussion.
For a more complete discussion of the Macro Variables or 
micro transaction space market development , see my Virtual 








Purpose of Exchange Prices
 No limits to exchanges other than asset or 
analyst capacity
 Profitability not goal
 Recorded transactions for analysis
 After action records
 Provide long range market indicators
 Start producing mechanisms for 
metrics/feedback for effects based operations
The purpose of “prices” in the military market are primarily for 
post analysis and comparison purposes.  The exchange of a 
cost basis is an indirect incentive to participate in a military
market.  Decisions are not necessarily made because 
something is cheaper, etc.  In military markets, how successful 
a solution performs is a better measurement.  However, the 
power of recording all transactions in some way (by cost basis 
or points, etc) is powerful for post transaction analysis.  
Recording a cost basis is a good representation of a market, 
because the cost basis is where commercial markets would 
start to compute their pricing strategies.  In a military market, 
these recorded transactions become interesting when 
accumulated over a time period, by operation, etc (See 
analysis slide)
Notes: The best market analysis comes from true costs being reflected (and not 
inflated, or under inflated)  (Thinking Strategically, p. 321)  Thus the market should 
probably use costs derived from common charts that are shared.  (In other words, 
calculated automatically and not actually submitted with bids, the bid is more a 
statement of resources expected to be used in the solution).
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Standard Product Cost 
Determination
 Routine products 
 Current intel briefs & summaries, military 
capabilities summaries, target graphics, etc
 Product prices based on average:
 Cost of raw materials*
 Cost of human analysis** 
 Prices published to portfolio page
 Prices changed by capacity count
*   Prices derived in the same manner as tailored products
**  See human analysis cost slide





Tailored Product Cost 
Determination by Market
 Cost of Raw Materials
 Database access by subscription*
 Tasked asset published costs
 Cost of Human Analysis**
 Cost calculation included in solution bid 
 Price changed by organization capacity reaching 
predetermined limits  
*   Recommend recovery of subscription cost by first x number of products
**  See human analysis cost slide
When tailored products are presented back to the consumer 
as solutions they should provide the estimated resources of 
raw materials and amount of human analysis time expected to 





 This table illustrates an example of how to 
derive average human analysis costs by 
























Here are some suggestions for establishing a scale of 
analysis:
Average price for 1 analyst hour may be $20 or $30, ways to 
determine = look to commercial world, or divide up average 
military salaries to an “hourly rate”.
Then calculate a representative scale of effort.  This one is 
only a suggestion, because it may be difficult to present 
solutions estimated down to the hour.  Similar methods can be 
used to determine other costs by scale, so that solution 
presentation are easier.
Notes: Argument for cost basis to be recorded in transaction:  In commercial 
markets or not for profit markets, prices are set to at very least recapture costs.  
Otherwise the organization is out of business.  Cost basis is a good place to start to 
establish value basis of the entire market and its individual components.
Other methods:  points for transactions.  Fine as long as market scale is 






 Year rate for one analyst subscription*
 Some lesser value for short term
 Monthly, quarterly, etc
1 Year $xxx1 Year $XXX
1 Month $xx1 Month $XX
SIGINT SubscriptionIMINT Subscription
*Subscription based on estimated annual database cost figure recuperated by some number of subscriptions
Here subscription rates are presented by the yearly and 
monthly rates.  Subscription are based on estimated annual 
database cost figure recuperated by some number of 
subscriptions.  This would vary significantly based on where 




 Number of items in the database
 Collection cost estimate--asset costs assessed from 
original source (one or many assets)
 Human analysis conducted? % of DB items
 By analysis type (1-4)
 Add analysis cost to that % of items
 Add publisher & database admin cost per year*
 Determine # subscriptions expected to cover costs to 
determine price 




Demand Counts –> Capacity 
 Product prices are charged as posted or derived 
until demand exceeds certain capacity
 Subscription rates increase after # attained/year
 Raw materials prices increase by asset tasking 
exceeding some % capacity
 Analyst products increase after demand over time 
exceeds some % normal capacity
 Demand metrics can work with priority to 
determine queuing rules of assets or analysis
Here are some example market policies that involve the 
demand and capacity counts.
Example of a capacity count: the asset is tasked at capacity, to
get priority in queue requirement needs to be high priority and 
pay more than “back of the line”, and meet its time 
requirement.  In this way, the market can respond to time 
sensitive targeting, and high priority operations.
It also presents a measured metric for how often an asset or 
organization exceed capacity and encourage alternative 
solutions or asset taskings to meet the current demand and 





 Database feedback (monthly, quarterly)
 Quality measures of value of database
 DB item feedback for specialty products, field data, 
analysis products
 Tailored products – per item feedback
 Value for submission of feedback or penalty for 
non-submission
 Feedback submitted no later than …(post 
operations) 
Here are some examples of performance metrics captured in 
feedback from consumers.  It may be useful to update 
feedback and performance metrics with time.  This needs to 




Measures of Intel Feedback
 Anticipatory of commander needs
 Timely- available when required (range)
 Accurate- intelligence must be factual & estimate future 
adversary courses of action 
 Usable- tailored to commander’s needs
 Complete- reflect the fullest degree of knowledge
 Relevant- intelligence must be related to the current 
operation, not trivial & up to date with situation 
changes
 Objective- unbiased & undistorted
 Available- includes timeliness, usability, at the lowest 
classification level possible (Joint Publication 2-0, 2000)
Joint Publication 2.0 offers these attributes of the quality of 
intelligence: These and other measures should be considered 





 Those things that the “invisible hand” will not 
facilitate in the market
 Intel Use case: queuing rules by priority & 
response time (jump in queue = cost more)
 Broker roles in each market may vary






 How to mitigate in a “market” way
 Rules to get into queue ahead of those waiting
 Validated higher priority (ie level 1= life or death)
 Pay a higher cost than others in line if time can’t be 
met otherwise
 Important that these priorities get met, and are 








 Long Term intelligence not accounted for
 Niche capabilities may not be well represented 
by the market
 Identifying National Security Strategy supported 
requirements could account for much of the 




 Capture sources used for final product 
 Choices of currency, score card , or cost basis
 Assets that only certain operators can see?
 Same for requirements--with limited or solicited only views
 Visibility of market by user id
 Feedback/performance measures ongoing?
 Found to be wrong later (IE Iraq WMD) 
 Trace back analysis
 Indexing and error detection
 How is the market doing? 
 Everyone getting in same queue (good or bad?)




Relieve Ops Info Overload
 Hard to process information at tactical level
 Markets with distributed analysis help reach all 
capabilities & tactical fusion centers 
 Centers with capacity to process-- respond
 Help to focus “front line” on intel sensor input, 
context development, etc. less on analysis
 Reach to analysis & distributed processing of 
imagery, SIGINT, other tailored products 
 JIC brokers & Intel analysts respond
Virtual Markets can help to relieve Operational Information 
Overload in these ways.
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Markets Increase Knowledge Skills
 Intel market is also a knowledge repository
 New analysis methods and other solutions are 
quickly considered and replicated
 New data sources exploited
 Transaction space allow faster acumen of 
valuable intelligence skills
 Example analysis templates





 Markets are extremely scalable 
 Able to respond to crisis or new operations
 Meet normal operations and change priorities 
for crisis
 Short or long term relationships
Markets are highly scalable from normal transactions to high 
priority.  New requirements and markets can be established in 




 Develop virtual market prototype to experiment with
 Develop other use cases IO, OPS, hastily formed networks for 
disaster response, etc
 Experiment
 Refine transaction space & rules for one market
 Validate roles & operational requirements met
 Validate improvements to existing system
 Develop role out plan
 Possibilities, one op/AOR at a time
 Get most/all intel organizations required for that market to participate
 Develop market analysis tools – error checking, commander’s 
review, asset utility scales 
120
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